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Abstract 
Procurement fraud is an enormous problem and the South African news is 
perforated with reports of this illicit act.  
 
Procurement fraud occurs in all the phases of the procurement cycle, but this illicit 
act is mostly committed during the tender phase. Business does not see 
procurement fraud as a crime and therefor this crime is committed due to non-
existent internal controls and processes to assess the adequacy of these controls. 
The purpose of the research was to highlight that procurement fraud occurs when 
internal controls are being bypassed or if an entity has an ineffective internal control 
system. The researcher studied the appraising of internal controls to understand the 
role it plays in detecting, preventing and investigating procurement fraud, specifically 
during the tender phase. The research design utilised was a qualitative research 
approach and an empirical design plan or strategy, to obtain the information. The 
researcher opted for this design to obtain information from literature and information 
from individuals in appraising internal controls. This ensured a comprehensive data 
gathering process.    
 
The goal of this research was to provide practical recommendations to assist 
investigators in private and public sectors with investigations into procurement fraud 
during a tender. 
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corruption, procurement fraud, red flags and collusion. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL ORIENTATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reports on the procurement process in South Africa’s has riddled the country in the 
past few years; The Arms Deal, first appeared on the country’s radar screen in 1998 
(the case still to be completed), after a procurement package for just under R30-
billion was being signed. A series of allegations emerged of fraudulent activity 
concerning many of the contracts, including kickbacks, tender irregularities and 
over-pricing (Procurement Fraud, 2012a). Most recently the Celle – Saga 
(Commissioner of Police - R500-million lease deal) has taken centre stage. This 
case has been described as “shady and dodgy” in months gone by, as it did not 
follow normal tender processes (Procurement Fraud, 2012b).  
 
The occurrence of tender fraud is not only limited to the public domain, incidents of 
tender fraud in the mining industry has also seen the light. A construction firm won 
an irregular tender at Kumba Iron ore’s, Thabazimbi mine in Limpopo for the building 
of an early-childhood development centre, this after the construction firm built a 
house for the supply chain manager of the aforementioned mine – insinuating 
collusion between the construction firm and the supply chain manager (Stone, 
2015). Another example of tender fraud in the mining industry is that of a supply 
chain employee in Anglo American Platinum and a supplier, Turbo Tech Pumps. 
Here, it is alleged that a Contracts Manager of Anglo American Platinum conspired 
with the owner of Turbo Tech Pumps as to channel various orders to the 
aforementioned company (Prinsloo, 2015).   
 
In the court case of Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Limited trading as Tricom Africa 
v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Limited and Another (CCT 34/10) [2010] ZACC 21; 
2011 (1) SA 327 (CC); 2011 (2) BCLR 207 (CC), the Honourable Chief Justice 
Mogoeng Mogoeng indicated there was a heavy onus on organs of state 
(municipalities, provincial and national departments) to investigate allegations of 
procurement fraud when they realised it. 
 
Although the Honourable Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng in the above judgment 
refers to state departments, perhaps in light of the Honourable Judge Myburgh’s 
judgment the same onus rests with companies in the private sector to investigate 
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procurement fraud and underlined corrupt acts. In S v Botha and Others (1) 1995 
(2) SACR 598 (w), the Honourable Judge Myburgh stated: 
 
Ek stem saam met die staat se betoog dat die samelewing so gespesialiseerd 
geraak het en daar soveel wetgewing en bedrywe is wat geadministreer en 
gereguleer word, dat geen polisiediens in ‘n moderne samelewing sonder die hulp 
van privaatinstansies sal misdaad kan ondersoek en voorkom nie.  
 
Procurement fraud holds a reputation risk as it can cause corporations to be 
branded as corrupt institutions, scaring off potential investors; causing financial loss. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Hofstee (2006:85) is of the view the statement of a problem is not negotiable during 
research and adds: “No problem, no research.” Connaway and Powell (2012:45), 
Creswell (2014:114) and Salkind (2012:40) assert the problem should be stated as 
precisely as possible to prevent any discrepancy between what the researcher 
writes and what he or she means. With what the above authors stated in mind, the 
researcher has noticed during his career as a Forensic Audit-investigator through 
various reviews and investigations in the Mining Industry since January 2006, 
internal controls to detect and investigate the occurrence of procurement fraud, are 
invaluable. 
 
According to section 34 of the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act, 
AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) does not have to report occurrences of procurement fraud 
to the authorities if the value is below the threshold of R100 000.00, except for 
corruption. The audit-investigation fraternity of the company investigated the cases 
rather in-house. The company is of the opinion their audit-investigation function is 
best suited to conduct these in-house investigations since they are familiar with the 
relevant procurement policies and procedures of the company. The outcome 
determines if the individuals involved will be prosecuted or not. The presumed 
insufficient use of the fraud detection strategies in AGA contributes to the small 
amount of successful prosecutions concerned with procurement fraud. 
 
The researcher could not get statistics regarding procurement fraud only in the 
global mining sector, but a PricewaterhouseCooper’s (PwC) 2014 Global Economic 
Crime Survey revealed interesting figures regarding procurement fraud in the 
construction, energy and mining sectors. According to the aforementioned survey, 
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the construction, energy and mining sectors experience the most corruption and 
fraud of all sectors. South African organisations suffer significantly more from 
procurement fraud than other organisations globally. In the PwC survey a 
comparison was conducted between South African and global organisations 
regarding incidence of procurement fraud and discovered a 30% higher occurrence 
of procurement fraud in the South African organisations. The most common type of 
economic crime in the energy, utilities and mining sectors is procurement fraud and 
corruption. The survey also revealed that insiders commit 69% of procurement fraud 
and therefore the improvement of internal controls is critical. The aforementioned 
percentage is 9% higher than the same survey conducted in 2011 and therefore an 
increase in procurement fraud (PwC’s 2014 …, 2014).  
 
The researcher approached Paul Rautenbach of a private investigation firm, TSF 
Africa (Pty) Ltd (TFSA), for data regarding procurement fraud. Rautenbach (2016) 
indicated that TSFA has a diverse scope of investigations and forensic audits that 
includes investigations of procurement fraud in the South African mining industry. 
Table 1.1 depicts the reported cases of procurement fraud during the tender phase 
of the procurement cycle, investigated by TSFA for the period 2010 to 2015:  
 
Table 1.1: Reported cases of procurement fraud 
Year 
Reported cases of procurement fraud 
during tender phase 
Value “R” 
2010 2 876,000.00 
2011 1 567,000.00 
2012 4 5,032,000.00 
2013 4 9,400,000.00 
2014 7 16,250,000.00 
2015 11 31,700,000.00 
 
The analysis of the figures in Table 1.1 suggests that an increase in the occurrence 
and the value of procurement fraud during the tender phase has been experienced 
from 2010 to 2015. Rautenbach (2016) is also of the opinion from his experience in 
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investigating procurement related crimes that collusion between employees of two 
companies has a very important part to play during the commission of fraud during 
the tender phase. From experience in the investigation of procurement related 
crimes, the researcher concurs with the opinion of Rautenbach (2016).    
 
In light of the PWC survey and data from Rautenbach (2016), the researcher 
perused the investigating diaries of all thirty-five closed investigation files 
investigated by AGA and documentary evidence such as procurement 
documentation (in specific reference to tender documents) in the investigation files 
for the period 2010 to 2014. In the majority of cases, inadequate internal controls or 
the bypassing of these controls and collusion, were the main causes of irregularities 
during the procurement process, in specific reference to the tender adjudication 
phase of the procurement cycle. This can be attributed to poor contract 
management that entails different management controls such as, vendor vetting 
(identifying the vendor); Information Technology related systems to detect duplicate 
commodities and or invoices and the human element to follow checklists (controls) 
in place when an invoice is authorised. These internal controls were neglected or 
bypassed (through collusion) which had a negative effect on the internal and 
external investigation and the successful prosecution of the perpetrators.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion due to experience and from the data from the 
aforementioned closed investigation files, that the primary contributor to 
procurement fraud at AGA is the bypassing of internal controls and collusion 
between employees and the company submitting the tender.  
 
During the investigation of reported tender fraud cases at AGA, it became clear 
internal procurement controls play an integral part in the detection, identification and 
investigation of procurement fraud. The absence of these controls (adherence to 
policies and procedures dictating the methodology in how a tender enquiry is to be 
conducted) resulted in procurement fraud and associate irregularities not being 
identified and not being successfully investigated. This inevitably meant the 
continuum of the illegal acts and financial loss.  
 
It is therefore of paramount importance that the influence and effect of ineffective 
procurement controls during the adjudication stage of the tender process, is 
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assessed and investigated. The management control environment, if effective, 
resulted in more management controls being identified, and preventative strategy in 
terms of fraud prevention being implemented, which lead to the decrease in 
opportunity to commit procurement fraud. 
 
The absences of quantifiable mechanisms such as internal procurement controls 
have a negative effect on the prevention, detection and investigation of procurement 
irregularities at AGA. This resulted in an escalation in fraudulent and corrupt acts in 
the corporate sector because the illicit acts were not timeously identified and thus 
prevented or successfully investigated.  
 
This research was conducted within the researcher’s work environment (the mining 
sector) at his employer, AGA, and focused on the current internal controls in place 
to address procurement fraud.  
1.3 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
Gray (2014:53) and Mills and Birks (2014:204) are of the opinion that aims are a 
statement of the intent and direction of the research. Mills and Birks (2014:204) add 
that the aims of a qualitative study reveal your intention to readers of your study and 
tell them what you wish to achieve. According to Khan (2008:75), the main aim of 
research is to draw a conclusion, which may have regional, national, or universal 
application depending on samples selected. De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport 
(2011:94) further points out the aim of research is something planned or done. Flick 
(2011:89) is of the view research aims is the anticipation to create new knowledge 
and theories. To satisfy what the above authors stated in mind, the aim of this 
research was to assess the internal controls in place at AGA to investigate and 
detect procurement fraud. This aim allowed the researcher to make 
recommendations regarding appraising internal management controls to detect and 
investigate the occurrence of procurement fraud during the tender phase in the 
procurement cycle. 
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
Babbie (2010:92), Creswell (2014:124), Ruane (2005:11), Singleton and Straits 
(2010:107) and Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005:22) mentioned that the 
purposes of research are exploration and empowerment. Exploration is the attempt 
6 
to develop an initial understanding of something while empowerment according to 
Lichtman (2014:38) and Robinson (1994:12) can be explained as individuals gaining 
control of their lives and fulfilling their needs as result of their developing com-
petencies, skill and abilities to take part in their social and political worlds. 
Denscombe (2010:11), Denscombe (2002:27) and Leedy and Ormrod (2012:140) 
elaborate research is: 
 
 Evaluation: the research has investigated particular programmes, policies or 
case files intending to weigh up the strengths and weaknesses and consider how 
things might be improved. 
 Exploratory research: the weak points in the procurement cycle, in particular 
reference to the tender phase, were identified and addressed. The problem has 
been addressed by exploring and looking for new data by reading literature 
concerned with the procurement fraud, specifically during the tender phase and 
interviewing individuals with knowledge and experience in procurement fraud 
investigation. 
 Developing good practice: the new found data were used to solve the research 
problem and make recommendations for good practice to address the problem 
under research. 
 Empowerment: this research generated new knowledge and it may empower 
other individuals, by publishing an article and presenting the articles at lectures. 
 
Other individuals meant to be empowered through this research are internal 
auditors, company investigators and procurement employees by providing 
experience and new knowledge concerning internal controls in the procurement 
process and the detection and investigation of procurement fraud. In addition, the 
researcher attempted to empower “Top Management” in the mining fraternity 
through this research by reporting findings and providing recommendations on the 
research topic. This research empowered the researcher and his colleagues to 
solve practical problems and improve current procedures addressing procurement 
fraud and internal controls. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS UNDER INVESTIGATION 
Du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis and Bezuidenhout (2014:69), Leedy and Ormrod (2012:38), 
Mills and Birks (2014:204), Mouton (2001:53), Punch (2011:36-37) and Wagner, 
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Kawulich and Garner (2012:18) state that research questions are devised so to 
focus on the research problem identified and express of interest and intent. 
Research questions assist to gather new facts and methods to be utilised (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2012:38 and Rule & John, 2011:28). Leedy and Ormrod (2010:56), Mills 
and Birks (2014:204), Punch (2014:76) and Salkind (2012:44) mentioned that 
research questions express of interest and intent. 
 
Adding to Flick (2011:90), Rule and John (2011:31) and Wagner et al. (2012:18), 
research questions must be limited to between two and four questions because too 
many research questions will cause the focus of the research to be wide-ranging. 
The researcher has opted for two research questions in this research. To stay 
focused on the problem and in adherence to the above-mentioned authors’ 
proposals; the researcher focused on the following researchable questions: 
 
 What does procurement fraud entail? 
 Do internal controls contribute to the detection and investigation of procurement 
fraud during the tender phase? 
1.6 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
Berg (2004:29), Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2001:36) and Leedy and Ormrod 
(2012:44-45) articulate key concepts of research should assist you in focusing on 
the work accessible. Ruane (2005:51) emphasises the research must choose 
definitions best suited to the research being conducted. To adhere with the above-
mentioned authors suggestions: definitions that provide meaning of which the 
meaning will stay the same, the researcher have opted for the following concepts: 
1.6.1 Forensic investigation 
Zinn and Dintwe (2015:443) state that forensic investigation is the practise to 
lawfully establish evidence and facts to be presented in a court of law or at another 
form of hearing or tribunal.  
1.6.2 Crime investigation 
Benson, Horne and Jones in Zinn and Dintwe (2015:19) defines criminal 
investigation as a systematic, organised, thinking, reasoning, examination and 
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analysis process designed to search for truth, during which an inquiry and thorough 
analysis are conducted on all types of crimes or unlawful acts. 
1.6.3 Commercial crime 
Commercial crime can be defined as all crimes taking place within the commercial 
domain, including common law and statutory offences and regulations (South 
African Police Service, 1995:02). 
1.6.4 Assessment 
Loughran (2010:75) is of the opinion that assessment is to inspect, recognise, 
evaluate, observe and/or estimate the nature, value or quality of a process and/or 
item at a specified level. 
1.6.5 Internal control  
Gelinas, Dull and Wheeler (2012:228) define internal control as a process designed 
to provide reasonable assurance to management regarding the achievement 
objectives in the following categories: effectiveness and efficiency of operations, 
reliability of financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
1.6.6 Corruption 
It is the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain or benefit of a group to which 
one owes allegiance (Williams & Alan, 2000:55). 
1.6.7 Procurement fraud 
Procurement fraud can be defined as the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting 
anything of value to influence a business decision (Institute for Certified Fraud 
Examiners Learning Material, 2010:701). 
1.7 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
Denscombe (2002:43) and De Vos et al. (2011:94), are of the opinion research must 
contribute to new knowledge. This research has added new knowledge in the 
following areas and population: 
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1.7.1 Academic 
The Academic Community by providing additional knowledge to academics. The 
South African Public by providing information regarding the subject under 
investigation to empower themselves with the knowledge and stimulate their way of 
thinking concerning procurement fraud and its effects. For students, the research 
will be available as reference material for study, as a source of literature for research 
projects and may also stimulate further research in this field. 
1.7.2 Law enforcement  
The results of the research may contribute to a higher competence level during 
forensic and criminal investigations and an increase in convictions in terms of 
procurement fraud during the tender phase. Recommendations were made 
regarding appraising internal controls for the detection and investigation of 
procurement, ensuring reviews is more effective and assessment of the said illicit 
act. 
1.7.3 Mining sector 
The research assisted understanding the problems experienced with procurement 
fraud and the effects it may have on the industry. New and more effective 
procedures were recommended to address the problem because of the research 
conducted. This would ensure early detection and proper investigation of 
procurement fraud, which would cause a decline of procurement fraud and financial 
loss to companies. This research would also enable management to decide on how 
to address issues concerned with procurement fraud. In addition, this research 
would assist audit-investigation fraternity in the mining community by providing 
guidelines during appraising the control measures while investigating alleged 
procurement fraud. The AGA forensic investigation methodology can be amended 
to include literature that will add value. 
1.8 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH  
Flick (2011:89), Lichtman (2014:3), Marshall and Rossman (2011:59), Ritchie, 
Lewis, Nichollis and Ormston (2014:48-70) and Welman et al. (2005:52), agree a 
design is a plan or complete strategy to get research participants and obtain 
information from them. Maxfield and Babbie (2005:109) believe a research design 
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entails a set of decisions regarding the research topic, the aims of the research, the 
population and what research methods to be used and the purpose thereof. 
 
This research constitutes a phenomenological study because it explores the 
problem as experienced by the participants and the aim is to obtain a deeper insight 
to assist the researcher to be in contact with the world view perspective (Mills & 
Birks, 2014:182). According to Creswell (2013:69) and Du Plooy-Cilliers et al. 
(2014:28), phenomenological studies report and form part of a qualitative research 
approach because the common meaning of several individuals regarding their life 
experience of a concept or phenomenon. In this study, how individuals make sense 
of the world, was explored. 
 
To comply with Creswell (2013:69), Du Plooy-Cilliers et al. (2014:28), Flick 
(2011:89), Marshall and Rossman (2011:59), Maxfield and Babbie (2005:109), Mills 
and Birks (2014:182) and Welman et al. (2005:52), viewpoints and to attain the 
research, the qualitative research approach was utilised and an empirical design 
plan or strategy was used to obtain the information. 
 
According to De Vos et al. (2011:65), Leedy and Ormrod (2005:133) and Ritchie et 
al. (2014:37), qualitative research is undertaken when the researcher wishes to 
discover what the participants’ opinions and views are regarding a problem and how 
they experience it. Interviews were conducted with individuals within the audit - 
investigation fraternity at AGA, to establish what the true nature of procurement 
fraud is and how internal controls detect this kind of fraud.  
 
Flick (2011:89) and Marshall and Rossman (2011:59) further add qualitative 
research is conducted due to the experience of the researcher. The researcher has 
experience in assessing internal controls in policies and procedures to detect and 
investigate procurement fraud. Due to this experience and the search for further 
knowledge, the researcher was compelled to conduct this research. 
 
Denscombe (2002:124) believes empirical data is based on real world observations, 
particularly: to obtain information directly from the participants and to rely on their 
personal experiences. Denscombe (2002:6) adds empirical research is concerned 
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with getting out of the office and purposefully going to look for information. This 
viewpoint was embraced. 
 
Gratton and Jones (2004:8), Punch (2014:4) and Welman and Kruger (2002:57) 
also mentioned that empirical research supports developing new ideas through 
collecting data and is concerned with interviews and the analysing of secondary 
data sources. The statements of the above authors were complied by conducting 
interviews within the audit-investigation fraternity whom utilise appraising internal 
controls to detect and investigate procurement fraud.  
1.9 TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING  
1.9.1 Population 
Hair, Celsi, Money, Samouel and Page (2011:165) and Welman et al. (2005:52, 
162), state a population is the study of objects that may comprise groups, 
individuals, human products, events, organisations and the conditions they are 
exposed to or elements applicable to a research project. In this study, the population 
will be the audit-investigation fraternity of Group Internal Audit consisting out of 60 
individuals based in Orkney, Carletonville and Johannesburg in South Africa. This 
group is responsible for the audit-investigation function concerned with internal 
controls on AGA mining operations in South Africa, Africa, the Americas and 
Australia. The aforementioned group functions primarily out of AGA’s group Internal 
Audit Offices in South Africa. Due to time and financial constraints, the total 
population could not be interviewed and therefore a sample was drawn. A probability 
sampling method was used to draw a sample of 25. 
 
The population of this research consisted of individuals from the audit-investigation 
fraternity within AGA’s Group Internal Audit Department in the Orkney, Carletonville 
and Johannesburg area, falling within the working environment of the researcher. 
The individuals of the population, which consisted out of 60 individuals, operate as 
one unit and are based in the above-mentioned areas to address the needs of AGA 
business units in South Africa and on the aforementioned continents. These 
individuals are qualified in the same field, have similar qualifications and experience, 
received similar training, have similar job descriptions and are affiliated with the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners and Certified Internal Auditors.  
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1.9.2 Sampling 
The aim of selecting a sample in qualitative research is not to generalise, but to 
select the participants that can provide robust, rich and deep levels of understanding 
of the phenomenon under investigation. This means the people who lived or 
experience the circumstances of the phenomenon under investigation (Gray, 
2014:208). There are no rules to the appropriate sample size, but because of the in-
depth interviews with the purpose to find rich information, the sample size is small 
but it should not be so small that data saturation will not be reached (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2012:97). Due to this reason, the researcher drew a simple random sample 
of 25 people from the identified population and therefore every member of the 
population had an equal opportunity to be included in the sample. The names of all 
the individuals within the audit-investigation fraternity were written separately on a 
piece of paper and placed in a hat and 25 names were drawn.  
1.10 DATA COLLECTION 
1.10.1 Data 
Data for the research were obtained from literature such as books and documents. 
Documents which included reports, official briefs, instructions and Standard 
Operating Procedures of AGA and media as papers, newsletters, journals and 
magazines, were scrutinised for information and data. Empirical data was obtained 
from interviews and data from the researcher’s experience. 
1.10.2 Literature 
Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2006:122), De Vos et al. (2011:328-341), Fink 
(2010:196) and Leedy and Ormrod (2010:146) are of the view that literature refers 
to all the available research on a subject or topic. The literature utilised during the 
research was obtained from libraries and the internet. Sources comprised of 
international and local literature, including books, journals, articles, newspapers, 
research dissertations training material and internet sources. These were perused 
to obtain relevant information for this research. Where applicable, the latest 
literature sources available were searched for and used as a reference in the study. 
 
The data in the literature were compared with the data obtained from the 
participants. The information obtained from literature sources were combined with 
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the information obtained from other data gathering techniques and reported in this 
format in this research document.  
1.10.3 Interviews 
Jupp (2006:157) argues that an interview represents a meeting or dialogue between 
people where personal and social interaction occurs, but for research: An interview 
is a two-way dialogue in which the interviewer asks the participant questions to 
collect data and learn about ideas, beliefs, views, opinions and behaviour of the 
interviewee. 
 
As proposed by Barbour (2014:337), Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011:102), Lichtman 
(2014:248), Mills and Birks (2014:188), Mouton (2001:105) and Wagner et al. 
(2012:133), the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews relying on a 
certain set of questions in the attempt to allow the conversation to remain loose. 
This method allowed participants some leeway and freedom to express their interest 
concerning the subject at hand. These semi-structured interviews afforded the 
opportunity to obtain new and broad views of the participants and allowed to ask 
additional questions to resolve any unclear answers provided by the participants. 
Open-ended questions were used, allowing for additional questions to be put to the 
participants to explain vague answers. 
 
The interview was conducted in private surroundings (an office) and was based on 
a fact-finding process. Candidly, interviews with the research participants were 
conducted with an interview schedule with the same questions and whereon the 
answers were recorded. All the questions were put to the participants and the 
answers written. The questions of this schedule addressed the research questions 
and the research topic. The research participants are role-players in detecting and 
investigating procurement fraud. The information provided by them gave a 
complete, broad and holistic picture of appraising internal controls to detect and 
investigate procurement fraud. 
1.10.4 Personal experience 
The researcher experienced five years in investigating crime while employed in the 
South African Police Service, three years in the Mining Security fraternity and five 
years as a Forensic Auditor-investigator in the audit-investigation domain. The 
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researcher was also part of an elite precious metals investigation unit, the National 
Investigation Task Team (NITT) and acted as liaise person to AGA while part of the 
mentioned team. 
 
In the audit-investigation locale, various allegations of procurement irregularities in 
the mining sector were investigated. The knowledge and experienced gained from 
these investigations were applied daily into similar alleged irregularity reviews. 
 
A National Diploma in Policing from UNISA and a Certificate in Criminal Justice and 
Forensic Investigation from the University of Johannesburg during 2009 was 
obtained. A B-Tech degree in Forensic Investigation was obtained from UNISA 
during 2010.  
1.11 DATA ANALYSIS  
Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass 
of collected data (De Vos et al., 2011:397). As suggested by Barbour (2014:253) 
and Leedy and Ormrod (2012:159), the data were reviewed a few times and the 
information was divided into controllable subjects, patterns styles and relationships. 
The spiral analysis method was used to analyse the data. By using the spiral method 
and the advice of Creswell (2013:182), Leedy and Ormrod (2010:159) and Sharp, 
Peter and Howard (2002:113) the arrangement of the data produced new 
knowledge. In bringing order to the data, the following steps in the spiral analysing 
method were used: 
 
Organisation - The data was organised by breaking it into smaller pieces and 
creating a computer database. 
Perusal - The data collected was perused several times to obtain a sense of what 
the data contains as a whole. 
Classification - To get the meaning of the data, the data were grouped into 
categories or themes. 
Synthesis - Synthesis was attained by integrating and summarising the data.  
Induction - By incorporating known facts into the research as a general rule. 
Deduction - By studying all the facts (literature and interviews) which resulted in 
arriving at answers for the research questions posed. The outcome of the data 
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analysis enabled the researcher to make findings and recommendations regarding 
the research questions.  
1.12 METHODS TAKEN TO ENSURE VALIDITY 
Creswell (2014:201), Denscombe (2002:301), Flick (2011:207), Leedy and Ormrod 
(2012:104) and Wagner et al. (2012:243), indicate that validity centres around the 
degree to which research data and the methods utilised to obtain it, are correct, 
truthful and on target. The researcher ensured compliance with the following validity 
measures during his research. 
1.12.1 Sampling 
The target population represented individuals from the audit-investigation domain, 
who is involved in the detection and investigation of procurement fraud at AGA. The 
mentioned individuals have similar experience, qualifications and training. The 
simple random sampling method used during this research, is a known qualitative 
research method. Interviews were conducted with more individuals than the 
proposed minimum participants.  
1.12.2 Literature 
The researcher conducted a wide-ranging search to obtain literature regarding the 
subject under research. The researcher made use of newly published books and 
seminal sources,1 relevant to the topic under investigation. Recognition and citations 
were awarded to the authors of literature in the dissertation. Quotes from literature 
sources were recorded correctly and the data obtained was not manipulated and 
correctly referred to. Plagiarism was not entertained and a detailed list of references 
was compiled. 
1.12.3 Interviews 
De Vos et al. (2011:350), suggest that the reason for the interview be explained to 
the participant before the commencement thereof, the researcher complied with this 
suggestion. The researcher guaranteed the interviewee’s confidentiality and the 
interview was conducted in a discreet location to ensure privacy and that the 
participant’s attention was not diverted (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:149). 
                                            
1 A seminal source is the original source or base information of which the content has not changed. 
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The research questions and aim of the research determined the contents of the 
interview schedule and were based on the identified problem. A standard interview 
schedule was used for all the participants. This ensured that the same questions 
posed, assessed what they were theoretically supposed to measure. Identical 
questions in terms of the interview schedule were put to all the participants and they 
were not influenced during the interview. Sometimes, additional questions for 
clarification were asked that were not necessarily put to other participants.  
1.12.4 Analysing of data 
To ensure that the research results were not deceptive, the researcher made use of 
approved and valid data analysis techniques. “Validity means the accuracy; 
meaningfulness and credibility of the research, and that it will be worth the time and 
effort when you draw meaningful and defensible conclusions from data” (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2010:28). This researcher complied with the description of validity. The 
validity of the data can be supported, as it is actual information, reflecting the true 
state of affairs at the time of the research. The data in the research can be validated 
consequently if compared to the data in literature and personal experience. 
1.13 METHODS TAKEN TO ENSURE RELIABILITY 
Maxfield and Babbie (2005:130), Mouton and Marais (1992:81) and Ritchie et al. 
(2014:354), articulate that reliability is a matter of whether a certain measurement 
method applied repeatedly to the same article will produce the same result each 
time. Reliability is the consistency with which a measuring instrument yields a 
certain result when the entity being measured did not change (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2012:91).  
1.13.1 Sampling 
The sample represented individuals from the audit-investigation fraternity at AGA, 
who was involved in assessing internal controls for the detection and investigation 
of procurement fraud. All the individuals from the audit-investigation fraternity that 
forms part of the population in the Orkney, Carletonville and Johannesburg areas, 
had an equal opportunity to be included in the sample.  
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The mentioned individuals have similar experience and training. The sampling 
technique is reliable because if another researcher was to undertake the same 
research, he or she opted for the same sampling.  
1.13.2 Data collection 
Recognition and citations were awarded to the authors of literature in the 
dissertation. Internet information utilised during the research was referenced to the 
website addresses where the data were obtained. In reference to what Singleton 
and Straits (2010:49) argues, the researcher guarded against plagiarism. 
Documentation (not copyrighted material such as textbooks readily available) 
utilised during the research is available for examination. The data obtained from 
literature addressed the research questions under review.   
 
Data obtained from interviews regarding the research questions, was complete and 
the quality was excellent. Open-ended questions, in conjunction with semi-
structured interviews, were conducted with all participants, which did not limit the 
interviewer in only asking questions from the interview schedule. The various 
individuals were interviewed utilising the same interview schedule. The same 
questions were asked to all the participants, except on follow-up questions to 
individuals and no misleading was noted. The aforementioned interview schedule 
was drafted in conjunction with the study leader in this research. During the 
interview, the researcher listened attentively and the answers received were 
recorded verbatim as provided by the participants and were not manipulated. The 
researcher did not remark on any answers provided by the participant and no 
leading questions were asked. This ensured that if different researchers used the 
same interview schedule, that the outcome would be the similar. 
 
The researcher’s experience as an investigator allowed him to use creative methods 
during the interview to obtain valuable information from the participants. The 
participants were not forced to answer questions and their responses were their own 
version. A letter was forwarded in which the participants’ voluntary participation was 
requested and confirmed in the interview process. 
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1.13.3 Analysing of data 
The method utilised in this research to analyse the data is a recognised technique 
used in qualitative research to analyse data.  
1.14 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Maxfield and Babbie (2005:53) state that any person planning to conduct research 
in the criminal justice field should be sentient of the general agreements between 
researchers concerning what is proper and improper conduct during the inquiry. 
Mouton (2001:238) confirms the latter by stating the ethics of science are concerned 
with what is wrong and what is correct when conducting research. The researcher 
is adamant of the importance of retaining morally accepted norms and values in 
scientific research, which he complied with in this scientific research. Plagiarism was 
not entertained, sources were correctly referenced and acknowledged in this 
research. The data from literature was correctly cited and the author(s) was 
acknowledged in the text and reference list of this dissertation. Denscombe 
(2002:134) points out that a social researcher should be ethical in the collection and 
the analysing of data and in distributing findings of the research. 
 
The researcher complied with the expectations as pointed out by Denscombe 
(2002:134). Data gathered during this research was not manipulated.  
 
During the interviews the privacy of the participants were respected, and they were 
not misled. The responses from the participants were written in their presence and 
after the interviews, the responses from the respective participants were confirmed 
singly. The researcher acted ethically at all times and was objective. The 
participants were not discriminated against or influenced during the interview. 
 
The findings of this study are based on the research conducted and is accurately 
portrayed in this dissertation. This research will be available in the public domain 
and follow-up articles regarding this research will be published in accredited 
journals.  
 
Permission for conducting this research was obtained from AGA before the 
commencement thereof and the researcher made an ethical declaration to UNISA 
concerning this research on its conclusion.  
19 
According to Du Plooy-Cilliers et al. (2014:190), Leedy and Ormrod (2012:104-108), 
Ritchie et al. (2014:78), and Wagner et al. (2012:88), ethical issues fall into four 
categories with which the research complied with as discussed below: 
 
Table 1.2: Ethical issues 
Category Researcher’s responsibility 
Protection from 
harm 
The researcher ensured that the participants endured no physical or 
psychological harm. The participants were not subjected to strenuous or 
embarrassing situations. The tone of the interview was of such a nature as 
not to offend the participants. The interview itself was conducted in solitude 
and the researcher inquired on regular intervals if the participants were 
comfortable. 
Voluntary and 
informed 
participation 
The participants were approached and requested to participate only 
voluntarily. They were informed of the scope of the research to make a 
calculated decision to participate. Nobody was forced to participate in this 
study and the participants were made aware that they could discontinue their 
participation at any stage.  
Right to privacy The identity of the participants was kept anonymous and the information 
shared by them is kept confidential. Their responses were presented in an 
anonymous manner in the dissertation. 
Honesty with 
professional 
colleagues 
Participants in the research were informed of the processes to be followed 
and the purpose of this research. All the participants were treated equally.  
1.15 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
To assure a well-structured research report in which the content flows in a logical 
order and in which the research aims and questions are addressed, the chapters 
were outlined as follows: 
 
Chapter 2: Procurement fraud  
 
The focus of this chapter is on important aspects of forensic and criminal 
investigations and procurement fraud. A detailed review of the tender stage of the 
procurement cycle and associated irregularities was conducted to address the 
research question concerned with the detail of procurement fraud. In addition, red 
flag indicators of procurement fraud were examined to obtain an understanding how 
these indicators can assist in investigating procurement fraud. 
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Chapter 3: The contribution of internal controls to detect and investigate 
procurement fraud during the tender phase  
 
In this chapter, the focus is on important aspects of internal controls to detect 
procurement fraud as a risk and to discuss the research question of the contribution 
of internal controls to detect and investigate procurement fraud during the tender 
phase. Facets discussed comprised of the concept of internal controls, the necessity 
of internal controls in the procurement process and an analysis of policies and 
procedures in business and risks associated if no policies and procedures are in 
place. To conclude the discussion, the necessity of regular assessment and audit 
of internal controls in procedures and policies, is reviewed. 
 
Chapter 4: Findings and recommendations 
 
This chapter informs the reader of what was discovered during the research and 
relates to the aims and research questions on which the findings and 
recommendations are based. 
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2. CHAPTER 2: PROCUREMENT FRAUD  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Mining companies are losing enormous amounts of capital on procurement 
contracts because of misrepresentations made by contractors and lacking 
accountability procedures by a company. Recent numbers indicating that general 
market fraud in South Africa, including procurement fraud, has risen from 5% in 
2009 to 15% in 2012 (Greve, 2012).  
 
Mining companies are susceptible to procurement fraud because of the capital 
outlay of mining projects which is frequently far more extensive than that of other 
sectors creating the potential for a costlier financial loss. The collusion between 
employees and contractors may cause the non-delivery of work and the 
authorisation of variation orders on contracts increased in value to such an extent, 
that they should have returned to the market for tender (Greve, 2012).  
 
To add to this, Geis and Meier (1977:40) and Greve (2012) reason white-collar 
misconduct in the business environment takes on the form of commercial bribery, 
bribery of public officials directly or indirectly conclude high value contracts, and 
various other forms, including procurement fraud. 
 
This chapter will further focus on important aspects of forensic and criminal 
investigations and procurement fraud. A detailed review of the tender stage of the 
procurement cycle and associated irregularities will be conducted to discuss the 
research question concerned with the detail of procurement fraud. In addition, red 
flag indicators of procurement fraud will be examined to obtain an understanding 
how these indicators can assist in investigating procurement fraud. 
2.2 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION  
Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:17) motivate investigating any crime is sometimes 
wrongly seen as a haphazard process, while in practice; the investigation of crime 
is a systematic process with the goal to discover the truth. Tong, Bryant and Horvath 
(2009:7), ads there are different viewpoints on the investigation of crime and they 
mention that criminal investigation is characterise with the words “art,” “craft” and 
“science.” They see the art of criminal investigation as intuition, natural and 
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automatic feelings of problem solving. The meaning of crime investigation is further 
explored below. 
2.2.1 The meaning of crime investigation 
Buckles (2007:5) states that the word investigation is arrived from the Latin word 
investigare, which suggests tracking, inquiring into, searching for, or examines 
systematically. According to Unisa (2002:4), crime investigation comprises a sys-
tematic gathering and clarification of information of the alleged crime or incident. 
Benson et al. in Zinn and Dintwe (2015:9), Brandl (2014:3), Dantzker and Hunter 
(2012:6), Lochner (2014:6) and Monckton-Smith, Adams, Hart and Webb (2013:3), 
describe crime investigation as a systematic search for the most accurate and 
complete description or explanation of the events or collecting of crime information 
or behaviours being studied or investigated. 
 
Bennett and Hess (2004:6), Casey (2011:16) and Greene (2007:356) all refer to the 
reconstruction of past events as the investigation of crime. The above authors see 
the reconstruction of past events as a logical process whereby a careful evenly 
examination and observation is done to record evidence. According to Brandl 
(2014:XXI) crime investigation and evidence are inseparable and he mentioned that 
criminal evidence is collected to establish proof that a crime was committed. 
 
Gilbert (2010:34), Lochner (2014:7), Osterburg and Ward (2014:1-2), Van Heerden 
(1982:182) and Van Rooyen (2004:4) reason in the process of reconstructing past 
events, evidence is collected. This evidence can be subjective or objective clues. 
Subjective clues are evidence or information obtained from people and objective 
clues is physical evidence. According to these authors this information is collected 
to identify, apprehend and convict offenders as an integral part of investigating past 
events. According to the researcher, this refers to proof that a crime was committed. 
 
A simplistic explanation of what crime investigation encompasses is found in 
Lochner (2014:6). He is of the opinion that crime investigation is the search for the 
truth aimed at solving the crime transgression or irregularity. According to him, this 
definition was formulated over a period. In reviewing and analysing the description 
and the explanations of crime investigation, the following common but very 
important themes were identified and are interrogated below: 
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2.2.1.1 Systematic 
Zinn (2007:87) in his research mentioned that crime investigation could not be 
undertaken in an illogical or unintentional manner. A systematic plan of action or 
investigation process during which information is collected, is the cornerstone of any 
criminal investigation. 
 
Benson et al. in Zinn and Dintwe (2015:9), Buckles (2007:5), Hess and Orthmann 
(2010:6), Lochner (2014:7-8), Newburn, Williamson and Wright (2007:86) and Van 
Rooyen (2001:50) all refer in their version and discussion of crime investigation to 
the word “systematically.” 
 
Hess and Orthmann (2010:6) further elaborate on the systematic process and 
reason crime investigation is the systematic process of discovering, collecting, 
preparing, identifying and presenting evidence to determine what happened and 
who is responsible. This is in line with the views of Du Preez (1993:2), Gardner 
(2012:2), Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:17) and Zinn (2007:6) who strongly 
engages with the idea that these aspects are done to prepare for the legal process. 
The second theme identified is truth, discussed below. 
2.2.1.2 Truth 
Van Heerden (1986:189) provides a short but well-defined description of crime 
investigation by stating that it is a systematic search for the truth. In addition, it was 
noted by the researcher that central to the definitions of crime investigation by 
Bennett and Hess (2004:4), Forbes (2008:17), Gardner (2012:3), Lochner (2014:6), 
Monckton-Smith et al. (2013:2), and Van Rooyen (2001:50) is the word truth. They 
are further of the opinion that the sole purpose of crime investigation will always be 
to search for the truth that includes determining a suspected person’s innocence. 
Although Van Heerden (1986:189) does not provide a detailed description of the 
concept of truth, it will be an error to argue that the truth means only a guilty finding 
by the court. The researcher is in agreement with the above authors due to his 
experience. 
 
After the analysis of the responses from the research participants, it is significant to 
note that only one participant with investigation experience used the word “truth” 
during his explanation of what crime investigation is. In reference to the 
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aforementioned responses and the analysis of the literature, the last theme 
identified was the solving of the crimes. 
2.2.1.3 Solving the crime 
Buckles (2007:5), Dantzker and Hunter (2012:6), Forbes (2008:17), Hess and 
Orthmann (2010:6) and Monckton-Smith et al. (2013:2), all agree that the principle 
purpose of crime investigation is to solve the crime. Monckton-Smith et al. (2013:2), 
further elaborates on the purpose and argue that during the investigation of crime, 
it is the responsibility of the investigator to determine what happened and who the 
responsible party is. In the South African context, the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 stipulates under section 205 (3) that it is the 
responsibility of the South African Police Service to solve crime. This in effect means 
that it is the responsibility of the South African Police Service to determine what 
happened. 
 
Benson et al. in Zinn and Dintwe (2015:19), Lochner (2014:6) and Monckton-Smith 
et al. (2013:2), refer to a criminal investigation as an inquiry to expose the truth of 
the matter. These authors elaborate further, by stating that during crime 
investigation, it needs to be ascertained if an offence has been committed and who 
the responsible person(s) is and the gathering of admissible evidence which will be 
presented before a judicial authority (court). Adams, Caddell and Krutsinger 
(2004:3), Fish, Miller and Braswell (2011:15), Gilbert (2010:103), Lochner 
(2014:172) and Lochner and Zinn (2015:10), additionally, are of the opinion (from a 
crime scene investigation perspective), that crime investigation is not only to obtain 
information of witnesses and victims, but also to collect visible or invisible physical 
evidence at a crime scene that could assist in solving a crime. 
 
The participants in this research were requested to explain what their understanding 
of criminal investigation is and the most consistent response was that a criminal 
investigation is concerned with the investigation into facts of an act against a law. 
One participant with more investigation experience further elaborated that crime 
investigation also comprises of forensic investigation as a technique to investigate 
criminal activities. A participant with more audit experience was of the opinion that 
a criminal investigation is initiated to prove the guilt or innocence of a person(s). The 
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facts as discussed above are also applicable to proactive and reactive crime 
investigation, which will now be further examined. 
2.3 PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE CRIME INVESTIGATION 
Brandl (2014:4) and Tong et al. (2009:11), is of the opinion that the investigation of 
crime can be categorised as proactive or reactive. Proactive crime investigation is 
when a crime is expected by the police and through methods such as intelligence 
gathering and observation, they wait for the right time to arrest the suspects as they 
commit the crime. Reactive crime investigation is crime already committed and 
evidence must be obtained to link the unknown or known suspect to the crime by 
using objective or subjective clues. It is the opinion of the researcher that the 
investigation of procurement fraud may be proactive (information about probable 
collusion between the tenderer and an employee was received prior to the tender 
adjudication and contract award) or it may be reactive (assessing internal controls 
in the tender phase indicates there was a deviation from the normal process, raising 
red flags that triggered the need for further investigation). After exploring the concept 
of crime investigation with its different aspects, it would be prudent to examine 
forensic investigation and the nexus it has with the investigation of crime. 
2.4 FORENSIC INVESTIGATION 
Karagiozis and Sgaglio (2005:3) state that the term forensic has its origin from the 
Latin word combination of forum plus ensis, reminiscence of the public forum that 
the Romans used to debate legal matters and decisions were made of the said. 
 
Inman and Rudin (2001:5) and Van Rooyen (2008:14) point out that forensic 
investigation is a term regularly misused to give weight to an idea or statement. The 
word forensics has some sort of aura of reliability surrounding it (because it is 
scientific, it can be trusted). Forensics are also used to discredit an idea or statement 
(it is not scientific therefor it cannot be trusted).  
 
To elaborate on the view of the above authors, Benson et al. in Zinn and Dintwe 
(2015:19), Karagiozis and Sgaglio (2005:vii) and University of Johannesburg's 
Criminal Justice and Forensic investigation study guide (2009:4) reason forensic 
investigation is an in-depth, meticulous and systematic search for the truth that can 
comprise objective (accounts of witnesses and victims) and subjective (physical 
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evidence such as knife or gun) clues by gathering and recording of information, 
observation and the search for answers. Karagiozis and Sgaglio (2005:vii) see the 
truth as the proof of a person’s guilt or innocence.  
 
Gardner (2012:1-2) is of the opinion that forensic investigation can be regarded as 
the collecting of details which could serve as evidence in a court of law. It is the 
researcher’s critical view that this author omits to provide a detail description of 
forensic investigation that may lead to a wide-ranging interpretation of the concept 
open to criticism. Benson et al. in Zinn and Dintwe (2015:18), and Dintwe (2014:49) 
argue much confusion and debate exist in the investigation domain concerning the 
term “forensic investigation.” They conclude that investigations conducted by the 
private and corporate fraternity fall within the bounds forensic investigation. 
 
It is also the view of the researcher that the discussion of crime investigation does 
not differ from that of forensic investigation as both these concepts are concerned 
with finding the truth. 
 
The participants were prompted of their understanding of the concept on forensic 
investigation. The majority of the responses were that forensic investigation is only 
concerned with the investigation of fraud or monetary loss. Two participants with 
more audit experience indicated that it is the examination of documents. The 
researcher is of the opinion that the reason for the above responses is because the 
participants in this research is familiar with investigations in the private sector and 
therefore associate forensic investigation with an in-house investigation of fraud 
related cases. 
 
In the context with the responses received as discussed above, Van Rooyen 
(2008:14) is of the opinion that forensic investigation is linked to the investigation of 
corruption, fraud, embezzlement and or other white-collar crimes. The researcher is 
of the opinion that this includes the investigation into procurement fraud of white-
collar crimes. Aspects central to the term forensic will be discussed in more detail 
infra.  
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2.4.1 Forensic investigation in criminal and civil proceedings  
According to Pyrek (2007:16) forensic investigation is applying science in criminal 
and civil matters. White (2010:2) elaborates and provides a broader explanation 
what forensic investigation is. According to him, forensic investigation includes a 
wide spectrum of criminal litigation procedures, including consumer and environ-
mental protection, health and civil matters and civil and criminal negligence. He is 
supported by the view of Benson et al. in Zinn and Dintwe (2015:19-20), who are of 
the view that forensic investigation forms part of criminal and civil proceedings. 
 
To add to the views of the above authors, Echaore-McDavid and McDavid (2008:ix), 
Lambrechts (2001:93) and Stelfox (2009:132) state that forensics are the application 
of special knowledge to legal issues and is not limited to the investigation of crime, 
but also plays an integral role in applying civil litigation. In contrast, Nickell and 
Fischer (1999:1) additionally, see forensic investigation as the investigation 
applicable to courts. The aforementioned authors do not specify if they are referring 
to criminal or civil courts, but in their discussion, the researcher gathered that the 
authors are referring to criminal courts. 
 
From the sample participants, four participants with more audit experience were of 
the opinion that forensic investigation is the investigation into irregularities with the 
purpose to institute departmental hearings and to implement measures (controls) to 
safeguard against irregularities identified during the investigation. The majority 
participants with more investigation experience indicated that forensic investigation 
is concerned with the use of scientific methods such as handwriting and fingerprint 
analysis and the use of video and audio surveillance to obtain evidence of illicit 
activity. This evidence to be tendered in front of the court and or civil proceedings. 
The inference made by the researcher of these responses is that the participants 
with more audit experience indicates disciplinary or administration corrective 
measures while the participants with more investigation experience goal is to obtain 
proof to institute criminal proceedings.  
2.4.2 The use of scientific methods in investigation 
The researcher argues that forensic investigation comprises applying two disciplines 
namely, natural and social sciences as depicted in Figure 2.1 below: 
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Figure 2.1: Applications of forensic investigation 
 
To support and elaborate on the researcher’s argument, Echaore-McDavid and 
McDavid (2008:ix), Pyrek (2007:16) and White (2010:2) mention that forensic 
investigation includes the use of scientific methods during the investigation of crime 
but did not explain what are meant by scientific methods. Karagiozis and Sgaglio 
(2005:1) and Tong et al. (2009:183), explain scientific methods and are of the 
viewpoint it is the use of natural sciences of aspects relating to law. According to 
them forensic investigation covers a wide spectrum of natural science and scientific 
disciplines (Entomology – Study of Insects, Toxicology – Study of Poisonous 
substances, Dactylography – Study of Fingerprints) whose purpose it is to 
investigate crime with the goal to bring the guilty party to book. Dintwe (2014:196), 
Lambrechts (2002:83), Lambrechts (2001:93), Lambrechts and Theart (1996:1) and 
Nickell and Fischer (1999:1) additionally state that forensic investigation is the 
application of some or other scientific knowledge to a legal problem. To align the 
science aspect of this research subject, the researcher is of the opinion that 
Graphology – the study of handwriting may be applied during the investigation into 
procurement fraud.  
 
In relation to the social science aspect of forensic investigation, Nickell and Fischer 
(1999:1) state that the term forensic is so broad and includes criminology and 
applying social science. Monckton-Smith et al. (2013:8), concurs with Karagiozis 
and Sgaglio (2005:14) and states that forensic investigation is a continuously 
developing, multi-dimensional field that combines social science and natural 
science in a structured process within the bound of laws and procedure. Padhy 
(2006:1), additionally, is of the opinion that forensic investigation is a field in 
Criminology, a subfield of social science. 
Forensic 
investigation
Natural 
sciences
Social 
sciences
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It is the researcher’s critical analysis that the scientific aspect of forensic 
investigation is concerned with natural science of the above views, while the social 
science is applying special knowledge, techniques and skills used by the 
investigator during an investigation. This may include the skill to successfully 
interview and apply special methods and techniques to obtain a statement from 
witnesses or complainants. 
 
In terms of the use of scientific methods, one participant specified that forensic 
investigation is the use of science and technology to obtain evidence of an illicit act. 
The next paragraph is to elaborate on what Benson et al. in Zinn and Dintwe 
(2015:19), mentioned. They see the main purpose of forensic investigation to 
present evidence in court. 
2.4.3 Court orientated  
Dintwe (2014:197) and Nickell and Fischer (1999:1) describes forensic investigation 
as pertaining to, connected with or used in courts of law or public discussion and 
debate. Forensic investigation is an investigation where the facts of the investigation 
will be presented before a court of law (Echaore-McDavid & McDavid, 2008:ix, 
Pyrek, 2007:16 and White, 2010:2).  
 
Lambrechts (2001:93) and Swanson, Chamelin, Territo and Taylor (2011:28) 
motivate the aim of a forensic investigation is to apply scientific knowledge to the 
investigation of an incident and to provide impartial evidence on issues to the court. 
The above authors’ views are elaborated on by Horswell (2004:3-4) and Lambrechts 
(2001:93) being of the opinion that forensic investigation is aimed at instituting court 
proceedings.  
 
Van der Watt (2011:46) provides a new dimension to the concept of forensic investi-
gation as he is of the opinion it is a process that utilises technology and science to 
test principles that could be presented in a court of law to explain the events that 
occurred. 
 
It is the contention of the researcher in view of the statements above that not all 
forensic investigations are initiated to institute criminal court proceedings as these 
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kinds of investigations may also be initiated to investigate employee misconduct and 
or non-compliance with company policy and or procedure.  
 
It can be summarised that forensic investigation and criminal investigation differ little 
from each other, because the goal of both is to investigate crime and to present the 
truth before a court. The objectives of an investigation are further researched below. 
2.5 OBJECTIVES OF AN INVESTIGATION 
Having discussed the concepts of criminal and forensic investigations, it is prudent 
to examine the objectives of these investigations. According to Van der Westhuizen 
(1996:4), the concept of an objective differs from that of an aim as an objective 
precisely defines a commitment or action that must be accomplished within an 
appointed time and according to a specified standard.   
 
Axelrod and Antinozzi (2007:14), Becker and Dutelle (2013:17-18), Benson et al. in 
Zinn and Dintwe (2015:19-20), Giacalone (2011:5-7), Hess and Orthmann 
(2010:33) and Swanson et al. (2011:3), indicate that the following are objectives of 
investigation: 
 
 Follow-up on clues to obtain and generate additional evidence; 
 Identification of the criminal act;  
 Individualising the criminal;  
 Recovery of stolen property; 
 Involvement in the prosecuting process;  
 Determine if a crime has been committed or not;  
 Arrest the suspect and to present the best possible case before the prosecutor;  
 Investigate the crime and to assist the prosecutor in the prosecution process;  
 Tracking and preserving of evidence, and 
 The responsibility of the investigator on the day of the hearing and giving 
evidence.  
 
Becker (2000:8) adds another objective to the above list and is of the opinion that 
the processing of physical evidence is also an objective. The researcher is of the 
opinion that Becker (2000:8) includes the processing of physical evidence as an 
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objective as this processing may cause the gathering of further information 
concerning the investigation. 
 
Bennett and Hess (2004:5) and Van Rooyen (2001:56) state that the following 
aspects and investigation steps that Benson et al. in Zinn and Dintwe (2015:19), 
regard as the common features between forensic and criminal investigation are also 
important for a successful investigation in that: 
 
 A logical sequence of investigation be followed; 
 Physical evidence to be gathered in accordance with law and or per prescribed 
entity policy or procedure; 
 Witnesses to be interviewed; 
 All suspects to be questioned and within the rule of law, and 
 All information of the case to be documented. 
 
The research participants were probed to provide their view of the objectives of an 
investigation. The majority shared the view that the objectives of an investigation 
were to obtain evidence concerning an illicit act, discover the truth and to test it in a 
court of law. One participant with more investigation experience further elaborated 
it was to recover property. Further to this, two participants with more audit 
experience indicated that the objective of an investigation may include identifying 
discrepancies, the causes for the discrepancies and whether the controls 
implemented, are adequate. Another two participants with audit experience were of 
the opinion that the objective of an investigation was to obtain documentation to 
substantiate an irregularity allegation. In the researcher’s opinion it is evident from 
the responses from the participants with more audit experience that their view is 
assessment orientated to follow up on administration irregularities and the reason 
(cause) why processes were not followed and to correct these anomalies. The 
responses from the participants with more investigation experience heed a sense of 
identifying the person responsible for the illicit act, instituting disciplinary procedures 
and the recovery of possible losses incurred.  
 
Having discussed the concepts concerning criminal and forensic investigation and 
the objectives thereof, the investigation element has to be aligned with the illicit act 
of procurement fraud. Before analysing procurement fraud, the concept of fraud 
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must be first understood to understand how the crime of procurement fraud during 
the tender phase, is committed. 
2.6 FRAUD  
Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht and Zimbelman (2012:6) state that fraud is a universal 
term used, which include all the various means which human creativity can device, 
to obtain an advantage over another person by false pretence. According to Albrecht 
et al. (2012:6), a definitive rule can be laid down to describe fraud, as it comprises 
of trickery, surprise, cunnings and unfair ways to cheat another person. The 
researcher noticed in media publications that the word fraud is also used to describe 
the crime and that “add-ons” such as cheque or procurement is linked to fraud to 
categorise fraud into a certain category e.g. cheque fraud or procurement fraud. 
 
Fraud is described by Hints in the Investigation of Crime (1951:391), Joubert 
(2013:178), Olsen (2010:49) and Technikon RSA (1994:340) as a human venture 
that involves deception, determined intent, intensity of desire, risk of apprehension, 
abuse of trust, and rationalisation. According to Burchell (2013:724) and Van 
Rooyen (2008:128) fraud is committed by a person making a misrepresentation to 
another person (or entity for instance, with procurement fraud) causing a false 
impression causing this person to act to his own detriment. Burchell (2013:724) 
further elaborates that a misrepresentation can be made by conduct alone or by 
words and conduct. Joubert (2013:179) is of the opinion that a misrepresentation 
can be made verbally, in writing, by action or conduct. All these aspects relating to 
misrepresentation in procurement fraud are discussed in point 2.9. 
 
Van Rooyen (2004:178) state that the risk of fraud is higher than before due to 
increased complexities in companies, misunderstanding of the internal audit 
function, outdated and ineffective internal controls (ineffective internal controls in the 
tender phase may be exploited and assist to promote fraud) and complex 
accounting in companies which leaves open the door for misrepresentations.  
 
The participants in the research were questioned if they had trouble in proving the 
elements of fraud during a court case and disciplinary inquiry. All the participants 
indicated it is very difficult to prove the elements of fraud due to the collusion factor 
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between the individuals in the process and the unwillingness of witnesses to get 
involved.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion through experience that procurement fraud is 
considered as an administrative irregularity, as it is always disguised by dishonesty 
and deception. An impeding factor is that this kind of fraud is routinely committed by 
the supplier or contractor and the procurement official. 
 
Button and Gee (2013:11-13) argues that: “Fraud is a dynamic crime which is 
constantly changing with fraudsters identifying new ways to perpetrate it.” 
 
In South African Criminal law, every single crime has elements that have to be 
proven in a court of law before an act can be deemed as criminal. To prove these 
elements, a person has to understand what they are and therefore the elements of 
fraud will be discussed. It is the researcher opinion from experience that the act of 
fraud is also referenced in a company’s (private sector) disciplinary code as a 
dismissible offence and therefore has a civil aspect to it.   
2.6.1 Elements of fraud 
All the elements of the crime need to be proved in court to find a person guilty of 
fraud. A consensus exists that fraud consists of five elements: prejudice, 
misrepresentation, unlawfulness, causality and criminal intent (Minnaar, 2000). 
 
Burchell (2013:724), Burchell and Milton (1997:579), Joubert (2013:166), Snyman 
(2002:520), Van Rooyen (2008:130), Van Rooyen (2004:178) and Vona (2008:5) 
are of the belief that the following aspects must be taken into consideration before 
fraud can be proven. They are seen as the elements of fraud:  
 
 Distortion – The perpetrator must have distorted or misrepresented a fact to a 
prejudiced party. This distortion or misrepresentation can be made in writing, 
verbally, by conduct, and omission. 
 Prejudice – Snyman (2002:523) is of the opinion that prior to the court 
determining that fraud has been committed, the perpetrator must have caused 
harm to a third party termed prejudice. Snyman (2002:523) elaborates that 
prejudice may be actual or potential. 
34 
 Unlawfulness – It has to be proven that the act was unlawful, and not merely a 
misrepresentation. In isolation, a misrepresentation does not spontaneously 
constitute fraud. The Minister of Police v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (AD), the 
common rule is, that the unlawfulness of an act or omission is determined 
according to the perceptions of society to what is legally wrong or right. 
 Specific intention – The guilty party must have had the specific intention to 
mislead the prejudiced party, and only to mislead them. In R v Kruse 1946 AD 
524, R v Harvey 1956 (1) SA 461 (T) and R v Heyne 1956 (3) SA 604 (A), the 
perpetrator must intend to both deceive: therefore, the intention to persuade 
another to believe that something is true which is untrue, and to defraud: 
therefore, the intention to induce somebody to act to his prejudice on the grounds 
of the misrepresentation made. 
 Attempt – This refers to potential prejudice - if a letter or e-mail, comprise of a 
misrepresentation, forwarded to the prejudiced party and is lost along the way to 
the intended recipient. Although the letter is lost in the mail, the intention to 
defraud was present. 
 Misrepresentation made to a person – In S v Myeza 1985 (4) SA 30 T, 
Myeza’s allegation that by inserting the metal ring of a beer can into a parking 
meter and actuating it, that the misrepresentation was not made to a person but 
to a parking meter, was rejected by the court. It was found by the court that the 
misrepresentation was, in fact, made to the local authorities (municipality) and 
therefore constituted fraud. According to Burchell (2013:724) a misrepresen-
tation can also be made by silence in that the person remained or not speaking 
when he or she ought to do so. The research participants elaborated on their 
view of misrepresentation in Table 2.1 in point 2.9. 
 
The analysis of the definition fraud as defined by Burchell and Milton (1997:579), 
Joubert (2013:158-161) and Snyman (2002:520) revealed the similarity in the word 
“misrepresentation.” These sources describe fraud referring to the elements of the 
crime to wit – intention, unlawfulness, misrepresentation and that actual or potential 
prejudice may occur. After discussing the crime of fraud and its elements, the 
concept of procurement needs to be explored to understand this process and what 
it comprises, to establish how procurement fraud during the tender phase, is 
committed.  
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2.7 PROCUREMENT 
Procurement can be described as the acquisition of goods, services or works from 
an external source. It is desirable that the goods, services or works are appropriate 
and that they are procured at the best possible cost to meet the needs of the 
purchaser in terms of quality, quantity, time, and location. Companies and public 
bodies often select processes intended to promote fair and open competition for 
their business while minimizing exposure to fraud and collusion (Melton, 2008:170). 
 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2008:1145) and Morris and Pinto (2007:258) 
describe procurement as the process of acquiring services or products. It is the 
researcher’s viewpoint that the word “works” was omitted by the aforementioned 
authors’ in their description of procurement, because in the procurement milieu the 
word “works” is perceived to be similar to the word “service.” 
 
For this research, it was important to establish the concept of procurement. The 
participants in this research were requested to explain what their understanding of 
the concept procurement is. All the participants indicated that that procurement is 
the practice of identifying the need for a service and or product and then procuring 
the said services and or products from an external party. The positive responses to 
the concept of procurement laid a strong base for further questions of the research 
subject, as the participants are familiar with this subject.  
 
Melton (2008:170) further indicates that the basic functions of the procurement 
department are: 
 
 supplier identification and selection; 
 market research for supply(iers); 
 tendering and buying (creating purchase orders); 
 negotiating and contracting, and 
 supplier measurement and performance. 
 
The procuring of products and services includes contract strategy, contract 
documentation and selecting a contractor. Procurement encompasses all members 
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of the supply chain,2 including the individuals responsible for the operation and 
maintenance (Bower, 2003:1 and Turner, 2011:3). Procurement, according to 
Dominick and Lunney (2012:11), Mackie (2013:174) and Sollish and Semanik 
(2012:1) require the collective utilisation and management of good business 
practices that capitalise on value to the organisation through the attainment of 
commodities and services.  
 
Applying good business practices in the procurement process will ensure that the 
correct material (or service) in the correct amount is delivered. It also sets out the 
measures to safeguard the relationships with the suppliers and that they are 
appropriately managed with the regular review of supplier performance and 
resolution of contractor issues (Westland, 2007:173). 
 
Westland (2007:173) adds (from a project management perspective) that:  
 
The procurement process is initiated after the procurement plan has been 
approved and the supplier contract signed. The procurement process is usually 
managed by a single resource within the project (such as a procurement officer 
or manager) and overseen by the project manager. Without a formal procurement 
process in place, it will be difficult to confirm that the products provided by the 
supplier are 'fit for purpose' and therefore meet the requirements outlined within 
the procurement plan. It will also be difficult to identify and manage supplier 
issues, and this will therefore increase the overall level of risk to the project. The 
procurement process is terminated only when the execution phase is complete.  
 
Ribeiro (2009:27) and Turner (2011:3) states that purchasing or procurement is a 
unit in the organisation accountable for buying (procuring) goods and services which 
the organisation requires to conduct its prime business. The manner in which the 
procurement unit (department) performs its function, determines the efficiency and 
value add it has on the organisation’s performance. From experience, the 
researcher concurs with the statements of the aforementioned authors.  
 
The researcher’s analysis of the literature of procurement revealed that certain 
actions take place to procure the goods, site works and or services need to complete 
                                            
2 “Supply Chain” is the movement of materials from their source (factory) to the end user and 
includes purchasing, manufacturing, warehousing, transportation and customer service. It 
comprises people, activities, information and resources involved in moving a product from the 
supplier to customer. 
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or maintain a project or business. These actions would seem to be in a methodical 
cycle called the procurement cycle, discussed below.  
2.8 THE PROCUREMENT CYCLE 
Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace (2000:137) mention that the procurement cycle 
signifies the phases and events that occur in procurement through competitive 
tendering. According to Melton (2008:170), Panneerselvam and Senthilkumar 
(2009:241), Westland (2007:97) and Wiggins (2010:176) the phases during the 
procurement cycle comprise:  
 
 Phase one: Obtain relevant information (it is information relating to the item that 
must be purchased or the services of a contractor which must be procured) and 
compile a tender document. In the tender document information of the specifics 
of the item or site works or services needed, will be detailed. 
 Phase two: Send tendering documents to suppliers – after the specifics of the 
item or site works or services had been recorded in the tender document, it has 
to be forwarded by fax or e-mail to the prospective suppliers for pricing. 
 Phase three: Site surveys conducted by suppliers – if needed, a site3 meeting 
may be held to provide an opportunity to the suppliers to view the site specifics 
needed. 
 Phase four: Site visits by suppliers – these visits to assist the supplier to 
understand what the operating nature is and what the supplier will need to take 
into consideration when tendering. 
 Phase five: Return of tender documents by suppliers – after the suppliers have 
completed the tendering documents, it is returned to the company who 
requested the tender. 
 Phase six: Presentations by suppliers – the suppliers may also be awarded the 
opportunity to present to the company (in need of an item or service) how they 
would conclude on the item or service tendered. 
 Phase seven: Evaluating and assessing of tender submissions by the company 
who requested the tender – a commercial and technical evaluation of the tenders 
                                            
3 A site is the area of ground where the service of the contractor will be delivered. 
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submitted are conducted on the base pricing and the technical capability of the 
respective suppliers. 
 Phase eight: Meetings to discuss evaluation or assessment – meetings are held 
with the various in-house stakeholders of the company that called for the tender. 
During these meetings the tenders received from the suppliers are discussed 
again taking into account the pricing and if the suppliers will deliver as stipulated 
in the tender document – technical capability. 
 Phase nine: Appointing the successful tenderer – the announcement of the 
successful tenderer is done and the supplier is informed through post, e-mail and 
or fax. 
 Phase ten: Commencement of new contract – a contract for the supply of an 
item or service, is initiated with the successful supplier.  
 
Other authors have a different view of the procurement cycle in terms of the number 
of phases it comprises, referencing fewer phases as discussed. 
 
Hobe, Hoffmannová and Wouters (2011:59) and Ribeiro (2009:28) vary from the 
above-mentioned authors of the phases in the procurement cycle associated with 
the procurement of goods or works. According to them, the procurement cycle 
consists out of the following phases: 
 
 preparation of the tender documents; 
 advertising for contractors and suppliers; 
 receiving of tenders; 
 opening of the tender documents and assessment of tender documents; 
 preparation of tender assessment reports, and 
 awarding of contract and signature. 
 
It is the researcher’s opinion that Melton (2008:170), Panneerselvam and 
Senthilkumar (2009:241), Westland (2007:97) and Wiggins (2010:176) depicts in 
more detail the phases in the procurement cycle, whereas Hobe et al. (2011:59), 
and Ribeiro (2009:28) does not concur with the following phases of the former 
authors: phases three, four, six and eight. It is the researcher’s view that when the 
latter phases are not conducted, the tenderers are not afforded the opportunity to 
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familiarise themselves with the operational needs and expectations of the company 
requesting the tender. 
 
Wiggins (2010:176) further elaborates on the mentioned phases and states that 
every phase is vital to obtain information and to test which contractor or supplier 
offers the best service or product to meet the specification or requirement. 
 
The participants were requested to give their understanding of what the 
procurement cycle is. Most of the participants (N=13) concurred with the 10 phases 
of the procurement cycle as discussed above. In addition, six participants with more 
audit experience further added that slight differences might exist in an entity’s 
specific policy or procedure of procurement due to a difference in business 
processes. It is important that more focus be directed to the tender phase in the 
procurement cycle as this is the in scope area of this research topic. 
2.9 THE TENDER PHASE OF THE PROCUREMENT CYCLE 
The tender phase of the procurement cycle refers to Phase number 7 as listed by 
Melton (2008:170) and Wiggins (2010:176) and Phase number 4 as listed by Hobe 
et al. (2011:59), and Ribeiro (2009:28), supra. 
 
Chambers and Rand (2010:299) give a brief analysis in that the main aim of a tender 
is to ensure that the best contractor or supplier is selected for the services or supply 
of an item, taking into consideration economic, quality, stability and technical 
aspects. 
 
The tender phase involves an entity offering a project to the market and asking for 
tenders from other entities interested in being part of a project, or part of the project. 
The entity wanting the project to be performed is the “grantor,”4 while the parties 
interested in performing the project and offering to do so under certain terms are the 
“tenderers” (Delmon, 2009:417). 
 
Lewis (2012:1) and Nickson (2012:2) consider tendering can be described as a 
formal offer, duly made by one party to another, an offer made in writing by one 
                                            
4 “Grantor” is the company/entity requesting the tender. 
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party to another with an inclusive rate5 or price or an order for the supply or purchase 
of goods and or services. 
 
Bergemann (2015:112) and Powell (2012:72) further elaborate on the view of the 
above authors that a tender is a process where a company informs external service 
providers of a need for a service or item and request them formally making an offer 
of the mentioned requirement.  
 
When tendering procedures are properly managed, it provides the tenderers and 
the public with confidence of the transparency of the procurement cycle (process): 
selecting tenderers, healthy competition amongst tenderers to obtain the best price, 
value for money. This will also ensure that every aspect of the contract (price, 
quality, time and risk) is discussed. Effective tendering procedures may also 
increase efficiency by providing information, creating avenues for communication 
and reducing time for the required procurement (Delmon, 2009:419). 
 
Sayers (2002:22) is adamant that if no procedure for tendering exists, an opportunity 
for misinterpretation or worse, misrepresentation may exist. Delmon (2009:419) is 
of the view that tendering procedures need to be properly managed.  
 
To align the tender phase with the act of misrepresentation in procurement fraud, 
the researcher opted to engage with the research participants of their view of when 
during the procurement cycle misrepresentation are made. 
 
The participants indicated from their experience that misrepresentations (dealt with 
under the fraud section above) and alterations are normally made during the 
following phases in the procurement cycle explained in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Phases of the procurement cycle 
Percentage of 
sample 
Phase in 
Procurement cycle 
Methods employed 
25% 
Receiving  
(phase 10) 
Incorrect quantity and or quality received due to 
collusion between the contracting company and the 
receiving company. 
                                            
5 An inclusive rate is a rate inclusive of expenses i.e. petrol, transport and/or labour costs etc. Therefore, 
no extra charges may be levied regarding these expenses.  
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Percentage of 
sample 
Phase in 
Procurement cycle 
Methods employed 
1% Vendor Approval6  
The Vendor approval process7 by providing false BEE8 
certificates, VAT registrations, technical abilities and 
references. It is important to highlight that the literature 
study conducted did not mention the vendor approval 
process.9 
4% 
Contract Award 
(phase 9) 
Insufficient monitoring of rates invoiced by a vendor 
that may lead to over invoicing. 
70% Tender (phase 7) 
“Rigging” a request for tender to favour a particular 
supplier, leaking of tender information, receiving late 
tenders, inconsistency in applying criteria for 
adjudication, collusion between tenderers and 
employees in the tender requesting company. 
 
It is the researcher’s critical analysis from the responses of the research participants 
that procurement fraud is most likely to occur during the tender phase in the 
procurement cycle. The tender phase was examined and discussions were held with 
the participants having reviewed the responses, the method in conducting these 
misrepresentations will be explored further. 
2.10 FRAUD DURING THE TENDER PHASE IN THE PROCUREMENT 
CYCLE 
Vona (2011:179) is of the opinion that procurement fraud refers to the corrupting of 
the tender phase of the procurement cycle to ensure that a specific supplier is 
awarded the contract. Olsen (2010:111) adds that procurement fraud has been 
described as the least visible but yet the most common and costly category of fraud 
in industries. 
 
Fraud during the tender phase is always worrying for management and auditors 
alike because it involves the risk of corruption as collusion takes place between 
internal and external parties. Various ways exist where contractors, employees and 
tenderers can commit fraud if companies do not have an appropriate counter fraud 
                                            
6 Not referenced as a phase in the procurement cycle in this dissertation. 
7 Vendor approval is the process of confirming that a company complies with legislative 
requirements and capacity before entering into business with it.   
8 Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is a racially selective programme which gives certain 
previously disadvantaged groups (Blacks, Coloureds, Indians) economic privileges, which 
includes measures such as employment preference, ownership, management and preferential 
procurement. 
9 It is assumed that the authors in the literature study refer to already approved vendors.  
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and internal control assessment strategy in place (Button & Gee, 2013:11 and Vona, 
2011:179). Gee (2015:243) adds to the views of the above authors and is of the 
opinion that corruption during the tender phase occurs where an employee colludes 
with a third party to obtain a benefit.   
 
The perpetrator’s intention in the commission of procurement fraud during the tender 
phase is to corruptly influence the decision process by favouring one party to the 
detriment of the awarding organisation and to the advantage of the individual 
corrupting the process, or the contractor or customer receiving the corrupt 
advantage. The awarding manager is influenced by a bribe or kickback (receiving 
of monetary gift to influence the decision who to award the tender) and awards the 
contract to the contractor (Gee, 2015:244-245 and Vona, 2008:178). 
 
Cascarino (2013:18) adds that another method of procurement fraud during the 
tender phase comprises the cooperation between an employee working with a 
contractor to defraud the employer through the authorisation of bogus or fictional 
invoices, payment for services or products not supplied, or work never done.  
 
Atkin and Brooks (2015:357), Gee (2015:245-246), Kranacher, Riley and Wells 
(2011:382-397), Olsen (2010:111), Samociuk and Iyer (2010:20), Special 
Investigation Unit Training Manual (2010:118), Stamler, Marschdorf and Possamai 
(2014:72), Vona (2011:185-189) and the majority of the participants in this research 
state that tendering is the point where the procurement cycle is at its weakest (see 
Table 2.1). Various methods are employed to commit procurement fraud during the 
tender phase such as:  
2.10.1 Tender avoidance during the tender phase 
The structuring of the procurement cycle to circumvent or avoid standard tender 
requirements so that only a particular contractor could be used. Other types of 
tender avoidance include: 
 
 Structured purchasing – the process of issuing multiple purchase orders 
individually below the threshold level. 
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 Split tenders – the awarding of two tenderers a purchase order for the same 
product, but the tenderers in question are controlled by a common parent 
company. 
 Contract amendment – awarding the contractor additional projects without 
following the competitive tendering process. 
 Sole source – the process of procuring services and goods to a specific 
contractor without following the competitive tendering process. 
 Exigency purchase – an order deemed as urgent to bypass the control 
threshold and competitive tendering procedures. 
2.10.2 False statements during the tender stage 
The creation of false tender documents and using non-existent or existing company 
names on tender documents. 
2.10.3 Favouring of key control points 
Establishing a need by submitting a purchase order at peak demand times or under 
exigency conditions to increase the probability of paying a higher price for goods 
and services. This also refers to design and or specification settings are specifically 
designed to favour a certain contractor over others, which include: 
 
 Vagueness or lack of clarity in specifications which allows for a contractor to 
tender in a manner which appears to be cost effective while in fact the pricing is 
higher than the other tenderers. 
 Restrictive specifications are communicated to favour a pre-selected 
contractor. 
2.10.4 Tender exclusion 
The identification of tenderers, whom can tender, then structuring of the tendering 
phase to exclude tenderers willing and able to submit competitive prices or including 
unqualified tenderers as an illusion of competitive tendering phase. Examples of 
tendering exclusions: 
 
 excluding qualified suppliers by not including them on the tenderers’ list; 
 failure to distribute tender documents to tenderers; 
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 providing suppliers with false or misleading tender documents to discourage a 
contractor from tendering; 
 limiting the search for qualified suppliers; and 
 different tenderers contacted to provide the impression of a contractor search. 
2.10.5 Contractor selection 
The changing of procurement processing criteria, either the changing of the 
evaluation phase of tenderers for selection or the actual selection process. 
2.10.6 Contractor evaluation criteria manipulation 
Ways of manipulation include: 
 
 the establishment of a certain contractor criterion to favour a pre-selected 
contractor; 
 the establishment of a certain contractor criterion after tender opening; 
 request for proposals has certain defects known to the favoured contractor; 
 the preparation of specifications for the proposed tender by a contractor; and 
 financial adjustments due to specification, after the fact. 
2.10.7 Contractor selection process manipulation 
Ways to manipulate include: 
 
 the bypassing of the normal review process by a contractor; 
 pricing information of other tenderers communicated with the favoured 
contractor; 
 lost tenders or information – due to purchasing agent destroying a tenderers 
submission; 
 the contractor selection criteria favour a specific contractor during the selection 
phase; 
 after the tender opening, the contractual criteria are created or changed; and 
 false statement of a contractor’s assessment. 
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2.10.8 Management override 
The intentional authorising by management regarding selecting a specific contractor 
which bypasses control procedures and may cause that the contractor is selected 
which did not have the best overall price. 
2.10.9 Advanced communication of information 
Provision of information to a contractor of the selection requirements by an 
employee to the detriment of other tenderers. 
2.10.10 Contractor tender rigging 
Involves the collusion of tenderers amongst themselves to determine who will be 
awarded the contract and at what price. The following are schemes falling under the 
veil of tender rigging: 
 
 Unresponsive tenders from tenderers which provides the impression that 
competitive tendering took place. 
 Tender suppression by another contractor by withdrawing their tenders or not 
tendering at all. 
 Tender rotation whereby a preselected contractor provides the lowest tender on 
a rotating basis – tenderers collude to ensure that a high tender is received. 
 Market division is an agreement between tenderers not to compete with each 
other in a designated geographic area.  
 
Besides the views of the above authors, Hayton (2000), Olsen (2010:111), 
Samociuk and Iyer (2010:20), Special Investigation Unit Training Manual (2010:118) 
and Vona (2011:185-189) unanimously state that during the procurement cycle and 
in particular, the tender phase, fraud is committed by the way of misrepresentations 
and includes the following facets:  
 
 Facts are misrepresented in the content of tendering documents submitted 
during the tender or tendering stage (the tenderer misrepresents its financial 
status), the ability to conclude the tendered work, incorrect plant or employee 
compliment. 
 The factual nature in terms of the quality and quantity of the goods or services 
to be rendered is misrepresented. 
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 During the site, tender and or shortlist meetings, verbal misrepresentations are 
made. 
 Deliberate non-disclosure of conflicts of interest; failure to perform on previous 
contracts, this information could cause the disqualification from the tender phase 
of the procurement cycle. 
 Forged tax clearance certificates submitted, disguising the factual nature of the 
tenderer’s tax status with the Receiver of Revenue. 
 Purposefully not declaring or omitting to declare the degree and factual nature 
of any third party service benefactor or a subcontractor’s involvement in the 
performance of the contract. 
 Intentionally making excessive or duplicate payments for goods or services.  
 
An analysis of the responses received from the participants of methods used to 
defraud during the tender stage suggest, that: 
 
 40% (N=10) of the sample indicated bid rigging (contract promised to one 
tenderer – collusion between employees in the tendering company and the 
company requesting the tender); 
 20% (N=5) of the sample specified the leaking of tender information to tenderers; 
 16% (N=4) of the sample identified bid splitting (big project split into small parts 
so that the monetary value of each is below the authorisation threshold); 
 12% (N=3) of the sample indicated bid rotating (collusion between tenderers in 
taking turns being the successful tenderer); 
 8% (N=2) of the sample could not provide any method of defrauding during the 
tender stage; and 
 4% (N=1) of the sample specified that a supplier may tender under different 
names to improve his chances of being awarded the tender. 
 
The researcher is of the opinion that in terms of the figures above, bid rigging (40%) 
and the leaking of information (20%) may be paired together as the methods 
mentioned, relates to each other (collusion). 
 
It is the opinion of the researcher that the majority of the sample (60%) indicates 
that collusion is the main method utilised for defrauding during the tender phase in 
the procurement cycle. 
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It was also noted that some of the participants at first confused the concepts of bid 
rigging and bid rotation, but after discussions (and taking into account the literature 
sources as per point 2.10), it was established (through posing questions to the 
participants) that the crux was that collusion between parties were involved. The 
difference was the notion that during bid ringing, collusion occurs between the 
tendering company and employees from the company requesting the tender. During 
bid rotation, collusion occurs between the different tendering companies to establish 
who will be the successful tenderer and more often than not, at inflated rates.   
 
After analysing how fraud is committed during the tender phase in the procurement 
cycle, it is judicious to examine red flag indicators of procurement fraud. From 
experience, the researcher is of the opinion it is important to identify red flag 
indicators in advance because these indicators will assist to prevent and or 
investigate procurement fraud. The description of red flag indicators of procurement 
fraud will be addressed in the next point. 
2.11 THE DESCRIPTION OF RED FLAG INDICATORS OF PROCUREMENT 
FRAUD  
Walsh and Hemmens (2008:499) consider white-collar crime (including 
procurement fraud) can be viewed as the priciest financial crime. It is therefore 
crucial to identify and detect any sign of fraud at the soonest and act thereon. 
Magnuson (1992:100) mentioned it is prudent to conduct internal investigations 
before law enforcement agencies are informed of irregularities. 
 
Cascarino (2013:188), Rezaee and Riley (2010:106), Vona (2008:15) and Walsh 
and Hemmens (2008:499) are of the view that red flag indicators are a common 
term associated with the identification of fraud and indicates that the potential exist 
for a fraud scheme to materialise. The observation of a red flag is the triggering 
mechanism, an indicator or warning that something is not right, that should lead to 
closer scrutiny to confirm the existence of fraud. The researcher is of the opinion in 
terms of the aforementioned literature that red flags may also be utilised to 
determine the scope when assessing internal controls.  
 
The research participants were requested to describe the concept of red flags of 
procurement fraud during the tender phase in the procurement cycle. The majority 
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of the participants described red flags as warning signs and or trigger points of 
possible undue activity occurring, this view is based on actual occurrences in the 
past of fraud and or irregularities. One participant, with vast expertise in SOX 
controls, was of the opinion that if a red flag is present, it is not a confirmation of 
fraudulent or irregular activity, but rather an indication that preventative measures 
(implementation of controls and appraising internal controls) should be taken. One 
participant with more audit experience also stated that red flags are not actual 
events of fraud or irregularities but rather an identified risk that, if not treated or 
mitigated, may realise. Another participant with more investigation experience was 
of the opinion it is areas that might be open to fraudulent activities. 
 
The following 12 points are listed by Du Plessis (2007), Kramer (2012), Piper (2012) 
and Zikmund (2010) as the red flags of procurement fraud: 
 
 Recurring awards of contracts to the same supplier – the same supplier is 
awarded contracts on a continuing basis. 
 Competitive supplier complaints and protests – contracting administrators of the 
company requesting the tender does not entertain grievances and objections of 
other tenderers. 
 Criticisms about quality and quantity – frequent complaints by the company’s 
end-users in terms of the contracting supplier’s quality and quantity. 
 Various contracts awarded to a specific supplier just below the competitive base 
price – the tendering price of the vendor regularly awarded contracts, is usually 
just below the viable base price. 
 Irregular tender patterns - most suppliers’ tender prices are high, and one is low, 
an obvious irregularity that may be due to pricing on poor quality. 
 “Go-between” fees – the payment to a person in putting a tender together. This 
person, (may include an employee of the inquiring company) sometimes, can 
assist more than one tenderer that can cause tender information being shared 
and causing the tender phase in the procurement cycle not to be competitive. 
 Debatable tenderer - vendors sometimes take advantage of an entities' trust and 
several tenderers secretly collude to take turns being the lowest tenderer and 
tender prices higher than the market value. 
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 Awards to non-lowest tenderer - tender evaluators intentionally decide early to 
which company the contract will be awarded, without considering the other 
tenderers prices (one of the tender evaluators may also have a conflict of interest 
with the company to whom the contract is awarded). 
 Scope changes to the contract - additional work is added to the contract after it 
was awarded, unrelated to the initial inquiry. 
 Various post-award contract orders – work is added after contract award to 
increase the contract value. 
 Sole supplier – the market not sourced for competitive pricing due to a perceived 
emergency. 
 Debatable minority ownership – companies’ owners indicating being of the 
minority group, but they are not. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
companies are favoured during contract award, as it required that a company 
have a certain BEE spend. Fronting exists where a company indicates that it is 
a BEE compliant, but in fact, the “Black ownership” is non-existent and this 
fronting is used to obtain contracts. 
 
Piper (2012) concurs with Zikmund (2010) adding the following is also red flags of 
procurement fraud:  
 
 large gifts and entertainment expenses; 
 round invoice amounts;  
 copies of supporting documentation instead of originals;  
 duplicate payments;  
 sequential invoices paid;  
 unusual (large or round-dollar) amounts paid;  
 employee-vendor address match;  
 multiple invoices paid on the same date; and 
 slight variation of vendor names.  
 
On an open-ended question to the participants to what they see as red flag 
indicators of fraud during the tender phase, it was noted similarities exist in terms of 
their responses and the literature used for this study. The researcher compared the 
responses to the literature study and removed the similar points. The data not similar 
in terms of literature and the responses from the participants are detailed below:  
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 the close association of employees with suppliers or companies (possible 
collusion) - declaration of conflicts of interest not conducted; 
 regular failure to test the market for suppliers and prices; 
 acceptance of late tenders;  
 special specifications written by end users to ensure exclusion of certain 
suppliers; 
 inadequate access control to tender box – only one person having the keys or 
tenders not secured after submission; 
 only one supplier constantly tendering or submitting a quote; 
 repetitive orders placed of a value just below the next authorisation level; 
 lack of clear procurement procedures and policies; 
 lack of segregation of duties within the procurement process; 
 continuous management overrides; 
 procurement staff not taking leave; 
 omission of supporting documentation to invoices; 
 verbal work instructions;  
 work conducted out of contract scope; and 
 stock counts, not conducted.  
 
The researcher opted to divide (Charts 2.1 & 2.2 below) the listed responses into 
two sample demographics. The reason therefore was that during the interviews and 
on review of the participants’ biographical information it was noted that some of the 
participants have more investigation experience than audit experience and vice 
versa, although doing the same kind of work. This division was also done to obtain 
a better understanding what is regarded as red flags from an investigation (fraud) 
and an audit perspective (internal controls). 
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Chart 2.1: Investigation  
 
The participants with more investigation experience regard the extravagant gifts 
from suppliers as the main red flag of procurement fraud and collusion during the 
tender phase.  
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Chart 2.2: Audit 
 
The majority of the participants with more audit experience were of the opinion 
reoccurring awards of tenders to one tenderer and the excessive use of sole 
suppliers were the main red flags of procurement fraud during the tender phase. 
 
The researcher analysed the responses from the two groups and found there was 
a common denominator: the reoccurring award of tenders to a certain supplier. The 
researcher is of the opinion (to explain the reason for the difference in responses), 
the differences exist because the participants with more audit experience, mostly 
focus on administrative controls while the participants with more investigation 
experience are more inquisitive into occurrences out of the ordinary. 
 
In light of the analysis conducted as per Chart 2.1 and 2.2, it is the researcher’s view 
that central to the responses of both the mentioned groups, is the collusion factor 
between the tendering company and the employees of the tender requesting 
company. In light of the aforementioned view and data obtained from sources, it is 
the researcher’s opinion that it is imperative to identify red flags that will indicate if 
possible collusion is taking place between individuals involved in the tender. These 
red flags will also assist in determining a scope for appraising internal controls that 
will be thoroughly examined in point 3.6 in Chapter 3. 
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2.12 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the meaning and facets of criminal and forensic investigation were 
examined. It was concluded the aforementioned concepts differ little from each other 
as both concepts have the goal to investigate crime and to present the truth before 
a court. To align criminal and forensic investigation to the illicit crime of procurement 
fraud, the elements of fraud was explored to obtain an understanding of this crime. 
The procurement process and in more detail, the tender phase in the procurement 
cycle was studied to align the crime of fraud to the procurement function. This study 
revealed procurement fraud can be committed in any of the several phases of the 
procurement cycle, but the biggest risk is during the tender phase. The researcher 
focused on the tender phase of this cycle, which revealed fraud takes on various 
forms and different methods exist to commit procurement fraud. Literature study and 
the retorts from participants would suggest that the act of misrepresentation is the 
most frequent fraud element present in the commission of procurement fraud during 
the tender phase.  
 
It was evident the act of collusion between employee and contracting company plays 
an integral role in fraud during the tender phase. The theory of red flags was also 
scrutinised to attain an understanding how it will assist in identifying the commission 
of procurement fraud. It was learned from literature study and opinions from 
individuals investigating procurement fraud that multiple red flags of procurement 
fraud exist and that these red flags will assist in investigating and defining the scope 
for assessments of internal controls during the investigation of procurement fraud.  
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3. CHAPTER 3: THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNAL CONTROLS TO 
DETECT AND INVESTIGATE PROCUREMENT FRAUD DURING THE 
TENDER PHASE  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 2, facets of procurement, red flag indicators and fraud during the tender 
phase of the procurement cycle, were discussed. To elaborate on the latter and to 
bring the discussed aspects into context, internal controls in the procurement cycle 
to detect procurement fraud will be discussed during this chapter. Biegelman and 
Bartow (2012:94), Kass-Shraibman and Sampath (2011:299) and Vona (2008:1-2) 
is of the opinion, traditionally auditors relied on the evaluation of the adequacy and 
effectiveness of internal controls to detect and prevent fraud. The auditor would first 
document the internal controls and if deemed adequate, the controls would then be 
tested to ensure operating efficiency.   
 
This chapter will further focus on important aspects of internal controls in 
procurement procedures to detect procurement fraud as a risk and to discuss the 
research question of internal controls to detect and investigate procurement fraud 
during the tender phase. Facets discussed comprise the concept of internal controls, 
the necessity of internal controls in the procurement process and an analysis of 
policies and procedures in business and risks associated if no policies and pro-
cedures are in place. To conclude the discussion, the necessity of regular 
assessment or audit of internal controls in procedures and policies, is reviewed.     
3.2 THE CONCEPT AND IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL CONTROLS  
The researcher is of the opinion that before the concept of an internal control can 
be discussed, the theory of a risk(s) must first be highlighted. To align the statement 
of the researcher to literature, the following authors Collier and Agyei-Ampomah 
(2005:108), Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2008:1241), Gray and Manson 
(2008:212), Griffiths (2005:17) and Mortimer and Mortimer (2005:45) state a risk is 
any doubt about a future incident that might threaten an organisation’s ability to 
accomplish its mission. It is the chance of something happening that will have a 
negative impact on the objectives of an organisation. Smuts and Smuts (1992:133) 
add to the aforementioned authors that a risk is a chance or danger connected to 
something; the possibility of damage or loss – a daring feat. Having highlighted the 
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theory behind a risk, the concept and importance of internal controls will be 
discussed further in this section.  
 
Bologna and Shaw (1997:189), Manacorda, Centonze and Forti (2014:285) and 
Simkin, Norman and Rose (2014:395) reason companies face new responsibilities 
for the protection of assets and for reporting on the effectiveness of internal controls. 
Bologna and Shaw (1997:189) further state the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
and the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) of the Treadway 
Commission have settled their differences over whether internal controls should 
cover just financial reporting or extend to controls related to safeguarding assets, 
which usually fall under operational controls. A broad consensus was reached on 
the COSO definition of internal control and on a framework that provides a standard 
against which entities can measure the effectiveness of their internal controls. 
 
Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht and Zimbelman (2015:77), Bologna and Shaw 
(1997:190-191) and Giles (2012:20-21) mentioned it is believed that internal 
auditors have the specific responsibility for preventing and detecting fraud. They 
mentioned the role of auditors in anti-fraud work is sometimes poorly understood 
and rely on a traditional audit approach that is often ineffective to address fraud 
risks.  
 
Bologna and Shaw (1997:192-193), Dormán, Görgényi and Horváth (2013:201), 
Hopwood, Leiner and Young (2012:50), Loughman and Sibery (2012:86), Miller and 
Bredeson (2010:110), Sollish and Semanik (2012:19-20), Turner and Weickgenannt 
(2009:100-101) and Vallabhaneni (2005:297) reason internal controls assist a 
company to accomplish specific goals or objectives. Internal controls are important 
because they aid to prevent and detect fraud. These controls are a key element of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The 
internal control process is so important for public companies that in terms of the 
FCPA and SOX, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) is held criminally liable for weak internal control processes. In a South African 
company context, the above-mentioned criminal liabilities are also applicable if the 
mentioned company is listed on a United States of America’s Stock Exchange. 
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The researcher found during his research that SOX applies to all public companies 
in the USA and international companies that have registered equity or debt 
securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission, applicable to companies 
listed on the USA Stock Exchange (New York Stock Exchange). International mining 
companies such as AngloGold Ashanti is listed on the mentioned exchange and 
therefor SOX regulations apply to them. 
 
Cascarino (2013:103), Hopwood et al. (2012:51), and Vallabhaneni (2005:296) 
further elaborate on the above authors’ viewpoints by mentioning that internal 
controls are process oriented and therefore focus on the processes by which the 
company is run (managed) and not the outcome of such processes. They further 
add that internal controls comprise policies and procedures ensuring that goals and 
objectives are met, the effective utilisation of resources and that laws and 
regulations are complied with. Internal controls are structures of policies and 
procedures that protect assets, ensure precise and consistent financial reporting, 
and endorse compliance with laws and regulations and to achieve actual and 
proficient operations (Internal Controls …, 2011). 
 
From a fraud risk view Gottschalk (2010:33), Manning (2011:586) and McKinney 
(2015:569) are of the opinion a lack of internal controls, encourages fraud. 
Companies with ineffective internal controls are susceptible to fraud and therefore 
it is of paramount importance to establish controls to prevent and detect fraud that 
includes bribery, corruption and various other types of fraud such as procurement 
fraud. Investigations into fraud in the procurement domain, are difficult in the 
absence of internal controls or ineffective internal controls (Bribery in …, 2007).  
 
According to Lynford (2008:205), Rittenberg, Johnstone and Gramling (2011:141) 
and Vagadia (2014:73) certain risks are unique to a specific business entity, but that 
most risks can be managed and mitigated in an effective and specific system of 
internal controls. In the context of this research, fraud committed during the tender 
phase is seen as a risk. To mitigate this risk and to point out the importance of 
internal controls, these controls need to be sound and should contain key elements. 
The following are key control elements according to Graham (2008:28), 
(Governance and Internal …, 2014) and Sollish and Semanik (2012:19-20):  
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 Clear policies, guidelines and procedures should be laid down for the company’s 
various business functions. This will include policies and procedures such as 
staff administration and procurement of goods and or services.  
 Checks and balances will ensure that important business processes performed 
by a single person, is verified.  
 Proper record keeping of the activities carried out and the decisions made in the 
procurement department.  
 Information security is essential to the well-being of a company and therefore 
information need to be classified as confidential or open information.  
 Supervision by managers and or supervisors is invaluable. Conducting spot 
checks on the operations and business transactions is deemed to deter and 
detect irregularities. 
 Feedback channels being user friendly and confidential (Whistleblowing line or 
Hotline), need to be established.  
 Suspected fraud and corruption need to be reported to the authorities as soon 
as they are noted.   
 
The researcher is of the opinion through his experience of Bullet number 5 and 6 
above, that whistleblowing is a very important aspect in the internal control 
environment to address illicit acts and irregularities in business and therefore it 
needs to be highlighted. The definition of “whistleblowing” dictates that when an 
employee or former employee communicates information of a substantial ethical 
problem(s) to someone in a position to take action, and does this outside the 
sanctioned organisational channels. Particularly, whistleblowing usually occurs 
anonymously and it is encouraged by international organisations as common 
practise (Arszulowicz & Gasparski, 2011:84). 
 
In terms of section 1 of the Protected Disclosure Act, the word disclosure (when 
taken into consideration of the whistleblowing context) means: 
 
… any disclosure of information regarding any conduct of an employer or 
employee of that employer, made by any employee who has reason to believe 
that the information concerned shows or tends to show one or more of the 
following: (a) That a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or 
is likely to be committed; (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to 
comply with any legal obligation to which that person is subject; (c) that a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur; (d) that the 
health or safety of an individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered; 
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(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged; (f) unfair 
discrimination as contemplated in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 (Act 4 of 2000); or (g) that any matter referred to 
in paragraphs (a) to (f) has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. 
 
Lynford (2008:205) and Singleton, Singleton, Bologna and Lindquist (2006:89-90) 
elaborates on the view of Bologna and Shaw (1997:178) by stating the trademark 
of an effective internal control program is that it prevents and detects illicit acts and 
therefor due diligence are shown. Organisational due diligence includes: 
 
 Established compliance standards and procedures in an organisation to be 
followed by its employees and agents. 
 Oversight of these compliance standards and procedures should be assigned to 
senior management in the organisation.  
 Due care must be practised to ensure that substantial discretionary authority is 
not assigned to individual’s inclination to engage in illegal activities.  
 Steps must have been taken to communicate the mentioned standards and 
procedures to all employees.  
 Reasonable steps to achieve these standards should be taken by the 
organisation by utilising monitoring and auditing systems to detect criminal 
conduct by its employees and other agents.  
 
These standards should be enforced through the appropriate disciplinary 
mechanisms of the companies and discipline the individuals responsible for the illicit 
act. This may include criminal litigation as recourse. After an offence and or 
transgression has been detected, reasonable steps should be taken to respond 
appropriately to prevent further offences of this nature. For internal controls to be 
effective, the objectives thereof should be achievable and therefore discussed 
further below. 
3.2.1 Objectives of internal controls 
The common objective of internal controls, according to Bologna and Shaw 
(1997:192), Collier and Agyei-Ampomah (2005:xxii), Hopwood et al. (2012:53), 
Hussain (2014:26), Rittenberg et al. (2011:195), and Spencer-Pickett (2011:102) is 
to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Van Daelen and van der Elst (2010:65) and 
Warren, Reeve and Duchac (2009:355) have the same viewpoint as the 
aforementioned authors, but their emphasis is on the assets of a business and 
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business information. According to them, the objective of internal controls is to 
provide assurance that: 
 
 Business assets are safeguarded; 
 Business information is precise: and 
 Laws and regulations are complied with. 
 
In conjunction with the views of Bologna and Shaw (1997:192), Collier and Agyei-
Ampomah (2005:xxii), Hopwood et al. (2012:53), Hussain (2014:26), Spencer-
Pickett (2011:102) and Warren et al. (2009:355), Ainapure and Ainapure (2009:229) 
state from an efficient business viewpoint that the following aspects are objectives 
of internal controls:  
 
 ensure the orderly and efficient conduct of business; 
 prevent and detect fraud; and 
 ensure the timely preparation of financial information (year-end accounts). 
3.2.1.1 Attainment of the objectives of internal controls 
In achieving the objectives of internal controls, Bologna and Shaw (1997:192), 
Collier and Agyei-Ampomah (2005:xxii), Hopwood et al. (2012:53), Hussain 
(2014:26), Spencer-Pickett (2011:102) and Warren et al. (2009:355), suggest that a 
series or combination of fixed and constricted procedures are put in place to 
minimise risks. The reliability and integrity of financial reporting are confirmed as not 
to be disputed. These objectives can further be achieved by assuring compliance 
with the contractual stipulations. To promote tactical, strategic and operational 
efficiency to the maximum, will contribute to minimising risks in business. The 
corporate culture of the business also needs to be kept in mind when the objectives 
of internal controls are formulated with the goal of minimising risks to the business.  
 
Integrating the concept of corporate culture with the objectives of internal controls, 
this concept needs to be explained. According to Pfister (2009:3), a corporate 
culture is demarcated as the principles and actions in which company employees 
and management cooperate and conduct business with outside companies, 
including the dress code of the company, office arrangements, business hours kept 
and the manner in which clients are treated (Corporate Culture …, 2016).   
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To accomplish the objectives of internal controls, Shoemaker and Conklin 
(2012:144) are of the opinion since all processes originate from a policy, it must first 
be confirmed that general policies and procedures are defined and documented in 
a secure procurement process. These policies and procedures create and uphold a 
formal set of practical and behavioural controls over the procurement process. 
Procurement policies and procedures must provide the framework and guidance for 
procurement officials to do their work in a way that the procurement process is not 
exploited for personal gain (Larmour and Wolanin, 2013:xxi). 
 
The participants in this research were requested to elaborate on their understanding 
of the concept of internal controls. The response of seven participants with more 
audit experience was that internal controls are processes and procedures imple-
mented by management to prevent a risk from materialising. One participant with 
more investigation experience added that internal controls are put into place to 
mitigate fraud. Three participants with more audit experience added that internal 
controls target risk areas and are used to manage and mitigate risks. 
 
In terms of the aforementioned responses, the researcher’s conclusion is that the 
objective of internal controls is to mitigate a risk including the risk of fraud. The 
support that internal controls provide to manage, mitigate and prevent procurement 
fraud will be further addressed. 
3.3 THE ASSISTANCE OF INTERNAL CONTROLS TO PREVENT PRO-
CUREMENT FRAUD 
According to Cascarino (2013:102), Dawson (2015:89-90) and Guess and Farnham 
(2011:115) well defined internal controls are required to ensure and to contribute in 
the execution of projects and procurement. The mentioned authors also argue that 
internal controls will support the agreements previously made by the different parties 
in the procurement process. This means that effective internal controls will 
guarantee that procedures are adhered to and closely followed. According to 
Lynford (2008:205) internal controls will ensure that the processes, controls and 
procedures needed to detect and identify procurement fraud, are followed and 
therefore reduce the fraud risk. 
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The purpose of reviewing internal controls, according to Bologna and Shaw 
(1997:196), Collier and Agyei-Ampomah (2005:103) and Cowan (2005:60-61) are 
to assist regulators, the board of directors and contract officers in the evaluation of 
management's statements. Stamler et al. (2014:71-72), and Vona (2008:1) 
elaborates that auditors have historically had two methods to deal with procurement 
fraud. Firstly, auditors would search for fraud within the procurement process by 
testing internal controls to identify red flags of fraud and secondly, to react to 
allegations of procurement fraud during the procurement process received through 
the “anonymous tip-off line.” 
 
According to Hussain (2014:26) and Spencer-Pickett (2010:520) internal controls 
are only effective in its assistance to help detect procurement fraud, if regularly 
reviewed and updated in terms of the fraud risks, taking into account the changing 
business circumstances. Failure of internal controls is only part of the process 
concerning fraud in companies. According to Hussain (2014:26) and Spencer-
Pickett (2010:520) there is no universal fail proof internal control system against 
fraud.  
 
Goldmann (2010:201) state the effective and essential employment and monitoring 
of sound internal controls assist in ensuring that businesses meets their objectives 
by providing professional services to the community, while utilising resources 
efficiently and minimising the risk of fraud, mismanagement or error (Internal 
Controls …, 2011). 
 
For Atkin and Brooks (2015:356), Cascarino (2013:103) and Padgett (2015:84) the 
levels of authority in decision-making are very important. They suggest specific 
attention should be given to authority levels in decision making during the 
procurement process. This, will according to these authors, assist in detecting 
procurement fraud. They reason authority levels correctly structured will assist and 
ensure competency of supervision. If supervision is conducted during the 
procurement process from the start to finish, it will add and assist to the adequacy 
of the administration and management of procurement. This will have a positive 
effect on the procurement process. 
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By the views of the above authors, it has been perceived that companies have 
effective accounting controls in place, but procurement fraud is ignored as being 
seen as “off-the-books,” fraud not reflected in the accounting records. A 
methodology is demanded, both proactive and reactive to address and assist to 
detect the unique fraud risks in procurement (Procurement Fraud and Corruption, 
2012). 
 
The participants in this research study were requested to provide insight in terms of 
their experience regarding the role and effectiveness of internal controls preventing 
procurement fraud. The overwhelming view from all the participants was that 
effective and efficient internal controls would assist in preventing procurement fraud. 
One senior participant with more audit expertise elaborated that internal controls are 
only a tool and that if the internal controls are not managed correctly, fraud will occur. 
In addition to this view, three participants with more audit experience indicated that 
internal controls might well be seen as a deterrent for fraud practices. 
 
The researcher’s view is that in terms of the responses obtained from the research 
participants and the literature study conducted, internal controls are very important 
in preventing fraud and, secondly it may well be seen as a deterrent for would be 
fraudsters. In light of the previous discussion concerning the assistance of internal 
controls to detect procurement fraud, the necessity, the reasons and purpose of 
such controls also need to be investigated. 
3.3.1 The purpose of internal controls in the procurement cycle 
According to Basu (2006:41) and Bologna and Shaw (1997:196) auditors are being 
engaged to conduct audits of an organisation's compliance with various laws and 
regulations. The mentioned audits are being sought by the organisation to satisfy 
the regulatory agency and stakeholders that the organisation complies with 
applicable law.  
3.3.1.1 Law and internal controls 
Hall (2011:10-11) and Stimson (2012:100-101) elaborate on the importance of a 
suitable and manageable internal control system by stating managing an organi-
sation is required by law to institute and maintain an adequate internal control 
system. In light of the statements of the aforementioned authors, there is an onus 
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on a company to report occurrences of procurement fraud to the authorities if the 
value of the fraud is over the threshold of R100 000.00 as prescribed in section 34(1) 
(a) (b) of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. When there is a 
breakdown in the internal controls, the possibility of internal control inhibitors exists, 
which can advance and create opportunities for fraud and or corruption. 
 
According to Hall (2011:10-11) and Lynford (2008:205) part of the responsibilities 
the law requires to prevent malpractices, is that management should assess 
whether appropriate internal controls have been implemented in any areas they 
have identified as posing a higher risk of fraudulent activity. These responsibilities 
are requirements for good governance and are essential to prevent any crime, 
especially fraud in business (Governance and Internal …, 2014). 
 
In light of the relevance of law and internal controls as discussed, the factors 
influencing the effectiveness of internal controls are examined in the next point.   
3.3.2 Factors influencing the effectiveness of internal controls 
From the literature study, the researcher could determine three factors having an 
influence on the effectiveness of internal controls. These factors are the occurrence 
of fraud, the absence and manipulation of internal controls. In addition, Giles 
(2012:26) and Pfister (2009:5-6) are of the opinion there are two central questions 
about internal controls that directors and managers need to ask and address. The 
first question relates to the design effectiveness of the controls taking into 
consideration that the higher the risk, the more robust and durable the controls must 
be. The second question is concerned with the effective working of the controls in 
terms of the initial design. The researcher knows from experience that merely 
because a control or procedure is recorded in a manual or policy, it does not mean 
it will be carried out in practise. 
 
To add to above authors' view and that of the researcher, Loughran (2010:77) and 
Stamler et al. (2014:257), reasoned that weaknesses in the internal control system 
are strongly associated with the occurrence of fraud. The best internal controls are 
ineffective if employees do not follow and adhere to it. If management enforces 
internal controls and these controls are regularly updated, the business' internal 
control structure is more likely to be solid preventing the occurrence of fraud.  
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To bring internal controls into context with procurement fraud, Graham (2008:206-
207), Pedneault, Rudewicz and Silverstone and Sheetz (2012:99) state that 
effective internal controls ensure that procurement transactions and processes are 
conducted only with the appropriate authorisation, accurately recorded. The 
effectiveness of internal controls becomes a concern when effective internal controls 
are absent or vulnerable to manipulation. It is promoted that good internal controls 
therefore will discourage and identify fraud and error and minimise the exposure to 
risks by reducing the chance of unexpected events (Internal Controls …, 2011). 
 
All the participants in this research study were of the opinion that internal controls 
are a necessity and critical in the procurement cycle as it would ensure that 
adequate policies and procedure exist, governing the processes in the procurement 
cycle. The participants listed the following motives for their response: 
 
 Without the proper policies and procedures, the segregation of duties of 
employees may be compromised which may lead to collusion. 
 Sound governance policies such as Conflict of Interest, Code of Business Ethics 
and Conduct, Delegation of Authority, approved BEE policies and guidance, are 
seen as internal controls and are necessary to ensure Ethical business practises 
and the deterrence of fraud acts. 
 Proper systems (how the process within the procurement cycle is to be 
conducted) will allow for audit trails (evidence) for review and investigation.  
 
Based on these responses, the researcher’s opinion are categorical reasons (as 
stipulated above) motivating internal controls need to be part of the procurement 
cycle. After establishing the reasons for internal controls in the procurement cycle, 
the researcher will in the following discussion, scrutinize appraising internal controls 
to identify possible fraud risks within the procurement cycle.  
3.4 ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL CONTROLS TO IDENTIFY FRAUD 
RISKS WITHIN THE PROCUREMENT CYCLE 
According to Biegelman and Bartow (2012:97) and Bologna and Shaw (1997:177-
178), a compliance program (the appraising of internal controls) is a program 
designed, employed and is compulsory to prevent and identify fraud risks. Bologna 
and Shaw (1997:192), Graham (2015:2) and Warren, Reeve and Duchac 
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(2014:322) also mention the guidance provided in the Internal Control Integrated 
Framework report10 (drafted after the Treadway Commission’s11 recommendations) 
is designed to provide a common classification and explanation of internal controls 
and to create a standard by which the system of internal controls can be assessed 
by companies. Before addressing the appraising internal controls, it is important to 
focus on the components of an internal control system.  
3.4.1 The components of an internal control system 
According to Bologna and Shaw (1997:192), Graham (2015:3), Pedneault et al. 
(2012:99), and Warren et al. (2014:322-323), there must be five related components 
present and operational to have an effective internal control system. These authors 
indicate that: 
 
 A good internal control environment comprises of employees with integrity, 
ethical values and competence and management with good philosophy and 
operating methods. How management delegates authority and responsibility, 
also organising and developing employees and the attention and direction 
provided by the board of directors, contributes to an effective control 
environment; 
 The identification and analysis of relevant risks to achieve objectives which forms 
the basis for determining how the risks should be managed, is called Risk 
Assessment and an important component of an effective control environment;  
 Control activities in an effective control environment consist out of policies and 
procedures that ensure management instructions are complied with. These 
activities include approvals, authorisations, verifications, reconciliations, review 
of operating performance, security of assets and segregation of duties; 
                                            
10 Produced after the release of the Treadway Commission’s recommendations, this document 
provides principles-based guidance for designing and implementing effective internal controls. 
11 The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is a joint 
initiative of five private sector organisations, established in the United States, dedicated to 
providing thought leadership to executive management and governance entities on critical 
aspects of organisational governance, business ethics, internal control, enterprise risk 
management, fraud, and financial reporting. 
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 Good information and communication of data, including information about 
external events and clear communication from management is necessary to 
ensure an effective control environment exists, and 
 The last component of an effective control environment is concerned with 
monitoring, the process that evaluates the quality of the internal control system's 
performance over a period.  
 
After addressing the components of an internal control system, it is important to 
review the aims of this system.  
3.4.2 Aims of internal controls 
According to Cendrowski, Petro and Martin (2007:136), Dawson (2015:49-50), 
Franzel (2011:3) and Hall (2011:17) the aim of appraising internal controls is to 
confirm the efficiency of the internal control structure. Precautionary and 
preventative internal controls use a passive technique as a procedure that dictates 
the control to be adhered to. This passive technique is designed to reduce the 
frequency of the occurrence of fraud risks. Internal controls force compliance with 
desired or prescribed actions and point out non-standard events. Detecting 
problems are the second aim in assessing internal controls. Detecting controls are 
devices, techniques and procedures intended to identify fraud risks and events. The 
third aim of internal controls is instituting corrective controls being devices, 
techniques and procedures intended to rectify fraud risks and events.  
 
Collier and Agyei-Ampomah (2005:124), Johnstone, Gramling and Rittenberg 
(2014:171) and Pedneault et al. (2012:99), argue that a well-designed and effective 
assessment system of internal controls is the most effective measure to prevent 
fraud risks. Internal controls are part of the protective system against fraud risks 
within a company. These controls are aimed to prevent unallowable activity and 
transactions and to warrant early detection. Fraud is a more common occurrence 
than most organisations would believe that could have various effects on an 
organisation. Fraud is about opportunity and if there are no internal controls in place 
to limit the risk of fraud, the temptation is easily formed. This exposes an 
organisation to a greater chance of fraud risks (Internal Controls …, 2011). 
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To affirm the aims of an effective control system and to use a more cost effective 
approach to detect procurement fraud as a risk, Johnstone et al. (2014:76-77), 
Olsen (2010:119) and Vallabhaneni (2005:296) believe appraising internal controls 
constitutes the following: 
 
 identifying of internal control objectives (policies) management designed to 
ensure compliance; 
 identifying key internal control procedures management set to achieve 
objectives; 
 testing internal control procedures; and 
 identifying needed follow-up actions. 
 
To obtain a holistic picture of an internal control system, factors that have limitations 
on the effectiveness of the said system, is explored below. 
3.4.3 Contributing factors in the limitation of the effectiveness of internal 
controls  
Johnstone et al. (2014:76-77), Pfister (2009:5-6), Turner and Weickgenannt 
(2009:101) and Vallabhaneni (2005:297) argue it is not possible for internal controls 
to provide absolute assurance that fraud risks would be mitigated and diminished. 
According to the aforementioned authors, inherent limitations in internal controls 
exist and can be attributed to the following factors: 
 
 Inconsistent judgments during decision making of business objectives; 
 Human error occurs in an organisation, example: typing or calculation error; 
 Internal controls are circumvented or ignored; 
 Controls may not be cost beneficial as the implementation of the control may be 
costly; 
 Employee collusion with suppliers in arranging money for preferential treatment 
during the placing of orders; 
 Management override of controls occurs, when a decision is made and followed 
through in contradiction with set out policies and procedures, and 
 Incorrect application of control procedures, for example: The policy on 
procurement dictates a tender should be called if procuring of goods or services 
exceeds R20,000.00. The order is then split into two or three to ensure the order 
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amount does not exceed the mentioned limit and therefore no tender is called. 
The buyer can then place the order on any supplier as he or she is within the 
bounds of the mentioned policy. To align internal controls to this study, effective 
internal controls in the procurement cycle are discussed below.  
3.5 EFFECTIVE INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE PROCUREMENT CYCLE 
Dinapoli (2010) is of the opinion, having effective and well-designed internal controls 
in place for procurement, safeguards against the misappropriation of funds. Internal 
controls in the procurement cycle ensure unallowable purchases are prevented. 
This will ensure fair and open competition in the purchase environment and cost-
effectiveness in the procurement cycle. Dinapoli (2010), Olsen (2010:119) and 
Pedneault et al. (2012:99), list the following as internal controls and their aims in the 
procurement cycle which is detailed in Table 3.1 below: 
 
Table 3.1: Internal controls and their aims in the procurement cycle 
Internal Control Aim 
Clear lines of authority for approving 
purchases (before they occur) should be 
established. 
To ensure the approval is obtained and the 
costs to be incurred have been evaluated. 
Before authorising a major purchase, the 
availability of budget appropriations should be 
verified. 
To verify the availability of funds and that the 
budget is not exceeded. 
The approval to purchase goods or services 
should be approved by personnel other than 
the employee requesting the purchase. 
The aim of this control is to ensure the 
approval function is segregated to reduce the 
opportunity to commit fraudulent 
transactions/acts. 
All purchasing documents (such as requisitions 
and purchase orders) should be designed to 
include specific details about the items or 
services to be purchased. 
The aim of this control is to ensure a proper 
audit trail exists in terms of the purchasing 
process from start to finish. 
All purchasing documents should be 
sequentially numbered. 
This control is to allow for tracking of orders. 
Purchasing documents should have multiple 
copies so the receiving and accounts payable 
departments can be notified of the purchase of 
goods and services. 
This control is to facilitate communication 
about the purchases and expected arrival 
dates of items or services procured. 
Before the close of the fiscal year, a review of 
all outstanding orders should be conducted to 
determine if funds designated, should be 
continued, adjusted or cancelled. 
To ensure the goods or services which have 
been ordered are received. Further, that the 
funds that were allocated to the purchase and 
which may not be settled, are identified. If this 
is not done, it may cause incorrect financial 
reporting. 
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Internal Control Aim 
When goods are delivered, the receiving or 
packaging slips should be verified against the 
items delivered in terms of the quantity, type, 
and condition of the goods received. 
To ensure verification of the accuracy of the 
receiving slips to both: the actual goods 
received and to the requisition or purchase 
order. This will further ensure that payment will 
only be made for quantities ordered and 
received in satisfactory condition. 
 
In Table 3.1, the internal control and the aim of the control was pointed out therefore 
it will be sensible to introduce the following viewpoint mentioned in (Internal Controls 
…, 2011) in light of the facts mentioned in Table 3.1: 
 
One of the most serious threats to the success of any organisation is fraud. 
Misplaced trust, inadequate hiring and supervision policies, and a failure to 
implement strong internal controls can lead to an environment ripe for internal 
theft and fraud. The most important aspect to managing this risk is ensuring that 
the organisation has solid internal controls in place. 
 
Internal controls play a very important role during the tender phase and therefore 
the appraising of these controls, is very important and discussed below.  
3.6 APPRAISING INTERNAL CONTROLS - THE TENDER PHASE  
Wiggins (2010:176) described and explained the tender phase in the procurement 
cycle and referred to it as phase seven. He described this phase as the evaluating 
and assessing of the tender of a prospective supplier and mentioned that a 
commercial and technical evaluation of the tenders submitted are conducted on the 
base pricing and the technical capability of the respective suppliers. Although 
various other phases exist in the procurement cycle, the researcher will only focus 
on the appraising of internal controls in the tender phase. This, to address the 
research question concerned with the internal controls to detect and investigate 
procurement fraud during the tender phase. 
 
Internal controls regarding the awarding of contracts may be strong, weak or even 
non-existent. The overall objective of appraising internal controls in the tender phase 
is to ensure the attainment of the most appropriate quality and quantity of goods 
and services for the lowest overall cost (Cascarino, 2013:95). 
 
According to Dinapoli (2010), Giles (2012:51), Jones (2004:72-75) and Stamler et 
al. (2014:257), the following internal controls during the tender phase in the 
procurement cycle need to be assessed: 
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 Assess if the minimum purchase value was set for which a tender process 
needed to be initiated for example all purchases over a R100,000.00 a tender 
process should be followed. The aim and rationale of this control is to ensure 
competitive tendering and honest competition so quality commodities and 
services are obtained at the lowest possible price. It therefore needs to be 
assessed if a competitive tendering process was followed that also safeguards 
against favouritism, extravagance and fraud, while allowing interested vendors 
a fair and equal opportunity to compete. 
 Assess and confirm if the entity12 adopted its own policies and procedures for 
procuring of goods and services stipulating purchases not required to undergo 
the tendering process. The aim of this control and the reason for it’s need, to be 
assessed, is to ensure that competition is sought in a reasonable and cost-
effective manner for procurements below the tender thresholds.  
 
A combination of fourteen of the research participants’ answers indicated on the 
question relating to the need for assessing internal controls during the tender phase, 
that internal controls have to be assessed to identify possible fraud risks during the 
tender phase. Four senior participants with more audit expertise were of the view 
appraising internal controls will provide an opinion on the adequacy and effective-
ness thereof. They further indicated that this assessment will highlight any loopholes 
and deficiency with the internal controls, which opens the tender process to possible 
fraud.  
 
Dawson (2015:89-90), Doody (2008), Ingram and Hall (2014), (Governance and 
Internal …, 2014), Guess and Farnham (2011:115), Shackell, Ingram and Hall 
(2014) and Stamler et al. (2014:257), argue the undermentioned internal controls 
need to be assessed to ensure and warrant an effective internal control system 
during the tender phase in the procurement cycle. Assess the internal controls to 
verify if: 
 
 A tender panel (comprising members from the user department, procurement 
department and any specialist or technical department) to pre-determine the 
assessment criteria and select the supplier or service provider, was formed. 
                                            
12 A business or organisation is sometimes referred to as an entity. 
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 Suppliers were invited to tender by a newspaper advertisement and if the tender 
invitation included the product, item or service specifications to be supplied or 
rendered. 
 All tenderers were given the same information and confirm if a briefing was given 
to all interested tenderers shortly after tender invitation. 
 Proposals were submitted in duplicate and in sealed envelopes. 
 The tenders were safeguarded before the closing time (or with password control 
if they are submitted electronically), pending assessment by a panel. 
 At least two staff members were present to open the tenders immediately after 
the closing time, and that duplicate copies of the tenders for future verification 
were kept – the same rule applies for electronic tendering. 
 
Besides the internal controls to be assessed as discussed above, it is also 
necessary to verify if late tenders (as a rule must not be accepted) was accepted 
and that approval of the panel or the approving authority with justification, was 
obtained (Governance and Internal …, 2014). 
 
From and administrative and contractual viewpoint Chambers and Rand (2010:299-
302), Guess and Farnham (2011:113-114) and Shackell et al. (2014), argue the 
following internal controls during the tender phase in the procurement cycle should 
also be assessed: 
 
 It should be verified if the “right to audit” clause was stipulated in the negotiated 
contracts. 
 The assessment ought to confirm whether suppliers and staff were fully aware 
of the organisation’s (with which they are entering a contract) policies on code 
of conduct, gifts and entertaining, and conﬂicts of interest. 
 Assessment must also determine if clear authorisation levels for the procuring of 
goods and services, were adhered to. 
 Evaluate if prospective suppliers were vetted. 
 The assessment ought to examine that appropriate segregation of duties 
between the maintenance of supplier master ﬁle data,13 authorisation of 
                                            
13 The supplier master data file comprises all the details concerning a supplier such as the 
supplier name, VAT number, banking details, physical address etc.  
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purchases, invoice processing, the payment of invoices, accounting and bank 
reconciliation processes occurred.   
 
Doody (2008) and Guile (2015) concentrates more on the directorial aspects of 
internal controls and therefore the following administrative points need to be 
assessed:  
 
 is there a tender procedure in place regulating the process and is this process 
followed; 
 review the tender lists to confirm that no evidence of benefaction relationships 
between the tenderers, exist; 
 confirm if companies persistently failing to tender, were excluded from the tender 
lists; 
 assess if excessive use of single sources occurs, that rules out competitive 
tender action; 
 establish if the tender board was advised of the signs that would suggest tender 
rigging; and 
 validate if the contract makes commercial sense. 
 
After appraising internal controls to identify fraud risks within the tender phase of the 
procurement cycle, the necessity of regular assessments of internal controls 
recorded in policies and procedures need to be addressed. This will be explored in 
the next section. 
3.7 THE NECESSITY OF REGULAR ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL 
CONTROLS  
Bologna and Shaw (1997:184), Harrison and St. John (2014:165) and Needles, 
Powers and Crosson (2014:303) argue the necessity of regular assessment of 
internal control policies, by stating that precautions must be taken by an institution 
through monitoring and auditing systems to detect criminal conduct and irregularities 
to non-compliance of policies and procedures by its employees and stakeholders. 
The researcher is in agreement with these authors, but has learned through 
experience that organisational entities perform sporadic audits to confirm that 
management and staff are following the organisational procedures and policies, by 
implication – it is the verification if internal controls are adhered to. 
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The essence and necessity of regular assessments of internal controls are 
inseparable from an organisation’s management and this includes rules, 
procedures, practical methods and is part of the organisational structure (Dormán 
et al., 2013:201, Kass-Shraibman & Sampath, 2011:299-301 and Weygandt, 
Kimmel & Kieso, 2010:308-309). In addition, appraising internal controls creates a 
controlled environment that will enhance the implementing of policies and 
procedures (Internal Controls …, 2011).  
 
Hightower (2009:52) and Vona (2008:11) in their discussion regarding the necessity 
of regular assessment have a more aggressive approach. Their views are that 
management must be vigilant and distinguish between the documentation 
concerned with an internal control and the internal control itself. According to them, 
the mere drafting of a document describing the internal control is not the control. 
The internal control must form part of the process utilised by people to perform in 
accordance with the documented policies and procedures. Business transactions 
may indicate that an internal control is functioning, but if the employee is not 
performing the control procedure in conjunction with the control guidelines, the 
internal controls do not function as intended by management. 
 
The aggressive viewpoint of Hightower (2009:52) and Vona (2008:11) is envisaged 
by stating that when individuals use their positions of authority to override controls, 
it may well cause crime, irregularities and transgressions that cannot be tolerated.  
 
It is essential that an organisation must have organisational assessment policies 
and procedures. According to Albrecht et al. (2015:147), Biegelman and Bartow 
(2012:97) and Shah (2007:199), the lack thereof may cause problems such as:  
 
 unethical, uneconomic, inefficient, and ineffective business operations; 
 weak accountability of the responsible people in the case of the occurrence of 
irregularities; 
 unlawful actions; and  
 the lack of safeguarding measures against exploitation, maladministration, 
mistakes, fraud, and indiscretions in business processes. 
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Twelve of the participants indicated with a question regarding the necessity of 
regular assessment of internal controls, that it is of paramount importance that 
regular assessments of internal controls in the tender process are conducted. The 
following points were listed as reasons regular assessments need to be conducted: 
 
 To ensure that the tender controls are still operating as intended and have not 
been circumvented. 
 To identify areas exposed to risks, areas where inefficiencies could be removed 
and identify areas where best practices could be implemented to enhance the 
tender process. 
 To confirm any changes within the control environment during the tender phase 
and ensure the controls are still adequate.   
 
After internal controls have been established, the efficiency of these controls needs 
to be monitored to confirm the aims of the controls are being achieved. As part of 
the regular assessment of internal controls, continued monitoring actions need to 
be conducted that include oversight by management and supervisors that examine 
and expand the design, performance and efficiency of these internal controls. 
Appraising internal controls is used to monitor the performance of these controls 
(Internal Controls …, 2011). 
3.8 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the theory behind risk was examined and concluded on the 
understanding it is an occurrence influencing the potential for an entity to reach its 
goals and objectives. The concept and objectives of internal controls in relation to 
the risk component in procurement and more specifically the tender phase were 
explored. It was noted the most prominent feature of an internal control is to mitigate 
(prevent) a risk and in specific reference to the risk of fraud during the tender phase. 
Throughout the literature study and interviews, it also became evident that internal 
controls are not only a concept of good business but is regulated by law in terms of 
SOX and the FCPA. The lack of and or weak internal controls in procurement (and 
clearly) in business processes, may lead to various illicit acts, including but not 
limited to fraud during the tender phase. Taking the aforementioned into 
consideration, the importance and necessity to assess internal controls to ensure 
the risk of fraud is mitigated, was emphasised.   
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4. CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Procurement fraud and in specific reference to this study, procurement fraud during 
the tender phase in the procurement cycle, has a momentous negative impact on 
business entities, not only in South Africa but worldwide. This research commenced 
due to a need identified and to increase the knowledge of the audit-investigation 
fraternity at AGA in assessing internal controls during the tender phase to identify 
the occurrence of fraud. 
 
The researcher discovered how the human factor in terms of collusion and the act 
of misrepresentation, contributes in a commission of a crime. The knowledge and 
understanding, the experience in human nature and the identification of signs of 
possible illicit acts, will assist in the investigation of procurement fraud during the 
tender phase.  
 
The researcher launched this study to research further a problem identified in his 
work environment by addressing what procurement fraud entails and to ascertain if 
internal controls contribute to the detection and investigation of procurement fraud 
during the tender phase in the procurement cycle. The aims of this research were 
addressed by employing national and international literature, World Wide Web 
resources and by interviewing participants from audit-investigation fraternity at AGA 
who is familiar with procurement. 
 
The research questions were divided into key concepts to address the research 
aims and the research questions of this study. The findings noted during this 
research and the recommendations concerned, are detailed below. 
4.2 FINDINGS 
The researcher attained primary and secondary findings, based on the formulated 
research questions to address the aims of this research. Recommendations were 
made, based on the primary and secondary findings. The most prominent finding of 
this research is the act of collusion between employees of a tendering company and 
the employees of the company requesting the tender. Further primary findings are 
detailed below.  
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4.2.1 Primary findings  
4.2.1.1 Collusion 
In this research, based on the literature study and empirical evidence, the 
researcher established that: 
 
 Collusion between individuals in the procurement cycle, specifically during the 
tender phase, is the main method to commit procurement fraud; 
 Fraud during the tender phase is difficult to prove due to the collusion factor 
between the individuals, and 
 The researcher found that collusion between the tendering company and 
employees of the company requesting the tender was the main method used 
during the commission of fraud during the tender phase. From the empirical 
evidence, it was established that 60% of the sample indicates that collusion is 
the main method utilised for defrauding during the tender phase in the 
procurement cycle.   
4.2.1.2 Misrepresentation  
 It was found that central to the finding of collusion, is the act of misrepresentation. 
 Due to collusion, the company tendering makes a misrepresentation to the 
company requesting the tender, which then causes that misrepresented facts 
are tendered and the tender company wins the tender. 
 It was found in the study that misrepresentations during the tender phase 
include: collusive tendering, bid rigging, exclusion of qualified tenderers, leaking 
of tender data and the manipulation of tenders. 
4.2.1.3 Red flags 
Similarities were noted between the responses from the participants and literature 
sources of red flags. It was found from empirical information the following are 
additional red flags: 
 
 a close relationship between employees and vendors may lead to possible 
complicity; 
 non-declarations of conflicts of interest; 
 the market not tested on a frequent basis for new suppliers and prices; 
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 tenders accepted after closing date;  
 distinct specifications for an item or service specified in the requisition;  
 unrestricted access to tender box as well as unsecured tenders; 
 tendering by only one supplier on a constant basis and the placing of repetitive 
orders just below the succeeding authorisation level; 
 nonexistence of clear procurement procedures and policies, including 
segregation of duties; 
 overriding of controls by management; 
 omitting to take a vacation by procurement staff; 
 backup documentation not attached to invoices and the acceptance of verbal 
work instructions;  
 out of contract work conducted; and 
 failure to conduct stock counts. 
 
From this research, it was also established that red flags: 
 
 Can be indicators of illicit activity such as tender fraud. 
 Are warning signs and or trigger points of possible undue activity occurring and 
an indication that preventative measures (implementation of controls) should be 
taken. 
4.2.1.4 Objectives of internal controls 
It was found the objectives of internal controls are to:  
 
 decrease risk to business and to protect resources; 
 verify commercial information;  
 conform law and regulation; and 
 avoid and discover fraud. 
4.2.2 Secondary findings  
4.2.2.1 Forensic and criminal investigation 
The researcher established the research participants had different viewpoints in 
terms of the concept of forensic and criminal investigation: 
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 The responses on forensic investigation from the participants with an audit 
background indicated disciplinary and administration corrective measures while 
the participants with an investigation background indicated the goal was to obtain 
proof to institute criminal proceedings. 
 The majority of the participants indicated that forensic investigation is only 
concerned with the investigation of fraud or monetary loss. A small group of the 
participants with an audit background specified, it is the examination of 
documents. 
 The participants with an audit background in the sample indicated a forensic 
investigation is the investigation into irregularities with the purpose to institute 
departmental hearings and to implement controls. The majority of the 
participants with an investigation background stated forensic investigation is the 
use of scientific methods to obtain evidence of an illicit activity. 
 The majority of the participants had a similar view in terms of what a criminal 
investigation is. 
 It was also found the participants had different views regarding the objectives of 
an investigation. The participants with an audit background were assessment 
orientated to follow up on administration irregularities and the reason for not 
following processes. Participants with an investigation background indicted the 
identification of the responsible person, the instituting disciplinary procedures 
and the recovery of possible losses, as objectives of an investigation. 
4.2.2.2 Internal controls 
In this research, based on the empirical evidence and literature, it was found that: 
 
 The objective of internal controls during the tender phase is to ensure an 
unambiguous process during the attainment of the most appropriate quality and 
quantity of goods and or services at the lowest cost. 
 Internal controls are a key element of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
of 1977 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. It was found a CEO and 
CFO can be held criminally liable for weak internal control processes. 
 Regular review of internal controls in the procurement cycle in terms of 
compliance to policy and procedure is of paramount importance to ensure the 
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effectiveness of these controls and to prevent the occurrence of procurement 
fraud. 
 Internal controls consist out of clear policies, procedures and guidelines. This 
includes, proper record keeping, information security, supervision by managers, 
the method of procuring goods and service and the manner in which a tender 
should be conducted. 
 Effective internal controls will guarantee procedures are adhered to and closely 
followed. 
 It was also found that effective internal controls would act as a deterrent and 
therefore prevent the commission of procurement fraud. 
 Internal controls are a necessity and critical in the procurement cycle as it would 
ensure that adequate policies and procedure exist, governing the procurement 
process. 
 Companies and entities with ineffective internal controls are susceptible to fraud; 
 Without the proper policies or procedures, the segregation of duties of 
employees may be compromised and may lead to collusion. 
 Proper systems including how the procurement process is to be conducted and 
allowing for audit evidence for review or investigation, was identified.  
4.2.2.3 Investigation 
In this research, based on the literature study, it was established that: 
 
 The purpose of an investigation is to obtain evidence, discover the truth 
regarding the incident or illicit act, and to present these findings to a court of law 
or at civil proceedings. 
 Natural and social sciences are embraced by forensic investigation. The 
scientific aspect of forensic investigation is concerned with natural science, while 
the social science is applying special knowledge, techniques and skills used by 
the investigator during an investigation. 
 The goal of crime investigation and forensic investigation is to attain the truth.  
4.2.2.4 Procurement process 
The literature study and evidence from the sample proved the procurement process: 
 
 comprises of a cycle with various phases; 
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 the nature of the business influences an entity’s policy or procedure regarding 
procurement; and 
 literature indicates two schools of thought regarding the amount of phases in the 
procurement cycle. The research participants agree with the 10 phases of the 
procurement cycle.  
4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
A purpose of this research was to develop good practice and to empower those 
involved in the investigation of procurement fraud. This is only achievable if the 
audit-investigation fraternity has sufficient knowledge and proper understanding and 
guidelines of what they are investigating. The researcher will therefore recommend 
supporting the findings to better equip the individuals involved in the investigation of 
procurement fraud and to enhance the internal control system of a business.  
4.3.1 Collusion 
 It is recommended that a company has a robust policy of disapproving the act of 
collusion during the procurement process. This policy needs to be widely 
distributed and communicated, not only to employees but also to suppliers. In 
addition, regular assessment of internal controls needs to be conducted to 
ensure compliance with procurement procedures.  
 
The researcher also makes the following recommendations: 
 
 Conflict of interest declarations - Management must ensure there is a 
comprehensive Conflict of Interest declaration process in place to assist the 
audit-investigation fraternity with the information needed to commence with an 
enquiry process;  
 Channels to make whistleblowing reports - Whistleblowing mediums (fax, 
telephone, web reporting) should be widely communicated. The policy needs to 
be clear and highlight the information provided, will be treated as confidential 
and anonymous; 
 Whistleblowing to form part of the agenda - during management meetings 
with departments, a dedicated person need to be assigned to take responsibility 
for the discussion; 
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 Information system - To identify people within the procurement domain 
(procurement department within a company and competing suppliers) to obtain 
information;  
 Investigative tool - Public available data indicating a person’s directorship in a 
company such as Deed Search and a Consumer Trace report listing the deeds 
against a person’s name and contact data – cellular phone numbers and 
addresses may be well worth the time in obtaining a nexus between individuals, 
and  
 Electronic investigative tool – The World Wide Web, in specific reference 
Google and Facebook assists in connecting the dots to link people.  
 Regular review of internal controls needs to be conducted to ensure the 
effectiveness of these controls. 
4.3.2 Training 
In terms of training, the researcher presents the following recommendations: 
 
 It is recommended that individuals within the audit-investigation fraternity need 
to undergo continuous training courses, including in service training based on 
the literature study and empirical information of this study.   
 It is suggested that individuals within the audit-investigation fraternity be 
educated in the subtle aspects regarding the elements of fraud to equip 
themselves in identifying and investigating the crime. 
 Individuals within the audit-investigation fraternity undergo procurement fraud 
training to equip them with the knowledge in identifying phases in the 
procurement cycle susceptible to fraud.   
 Individuals in the audit-investigation fraternity must be encouraged to equip 
themselves with the knowledge by study and attending courses, to empower 
them to address procurement fraud. 
 It is recommended that training be provided to audit-investigation fraternity 
employees of this concept and the social and natural science aspect of forensic 
investigation. 
 Individuals within the audit-investigation fraternity need to be trained to 
understand how the procurement cycle functions, including the phases in the 
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mentioned cycle. With this knowledge, the audit-investigation fraternity will 
identify anomalies and or red flags in the procurement processes. 
 Identified individuals in the procurement department to be trained in the concept 
and identification of red flags. 
4.3.3 Red flags 
The researcher recommends the following regarding red flags: 
 
 The attached checklist (Annexure A) of possible red flags is to be used during 
an investigation into allegations of procurement fraud. 
 Procurement staff also to be cautioned continuously to treat procurement 
information as confidential.  
4.3.4 Secondary recommendations  
In light of the above recommendations, the researcher thought it prudent to make 
secondary recommendations:  
 
 The audit-investigation fraternity should focus on identifying weaknesses in the 
internal control environment, to impede on opportunities to commit fraud. It is 
therefore suggested a document containing likely internal control weaknesses in 
the procurement environment, (especially during the tender stage), to be 
compiled and further researched. This document to serve as the basis when 
conducting risk based reviews in the procurement environment. It is also 
recommended continuous training is undergone to identify control weaknesses. 
 Internal controls comprise of policies and procedures that individuals should 
adhere to, ensuring compliance and the different business processes are 
conducted in a straightforward and ethical manner. 
 It is also suggested that procurement employees are profiled for criminal records 
as well as verification of references before being employed.   
 Individuals within the management structure of a company’s procurement 
domain should ensure internal controls are clearly stipulated in policies, 
procedures and guidelines. Corrective or disciplinary action, including retraining 
or redeployment, must be taken against individuals who does not follow the 
internal control process or override it.  
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 Employees in the audit-investigation fraternity and procurement department 
must comply with the FCPA and SOX legislation as it is listed on the New York 
Stock exchange. 
 Ineffective or vague internal controls need to be identified quarterly and 
amended to ensure more efficient internal controls. It is proposed that 
management must issue a certificate confirming the internal controls and risks 
have been reviewed. This certificate must be submitted to the Head of 
Procurement of the relevant company. 
 It is recommended that sound governance policies such as Conflict of Interest, 
Code of Business Ethics and Conduct, Delegation of Authority, approved BEE 
policies are developed to ensure fair and ethical business practises and to deter 
fraud.  
4.4 CONCLUSION  
The researcher was able to address the research questions by utilising the design 
and methodology of this research, that revealed appraising internal controls to 
detect procurement fraud during the tender phase, is very important and can serve 
to prevent and detect procurement fraud. This research established what internal 
controls are and how appraising internal controls will assist in the investigation of 
procurement fraud. Collusion was identified as the focal aspect during the 
commission of fraud during the tender phase in the procurement cycle. Red flags of 
procurement fraud serve as “early warning signs” that possible fraud is occurring 
and therefore it is imperative for the audit-investigation fraternity and procurement 
employees alike, to be able to identify and interpret these signs.  
 
Apart from the findings and recommendations made, it is imperative that the audit-
investigation fraternity align their efforts to not only identify a perpetrator in a 
procurement fraud investigation, but also strive to improve the internal control 
environment. Initiatives for training in procurement fraud and the role internal 
controls play, are very important. Allegations of procurement fraud are very difficult 
to prove because of the various dimensions. Individuals in the audit-investigation 
fraternity need to be acquainted and familiar with present methods used to commit 
procurement fraud during the tender phase in the procurement cycle.   
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6. ANNEXURES 
6.1 ANNEXURE A – RED FLAGS CHECKLIST 
1. Recurring awards of contracts to the same supplier. 
2. Competitive supplier complaints and protests – grievances and objections of 
other tenderers are not entertained. 
3. Criticisms about quality and quantity. 
4. Various contracts awarded to a specific supplier just below the competitive 
base price.  
5. Irregular tender patterns - most suppliers’ tender prices are high, and one is 
low, that's an obvious irregularity which may be due to pricing on poor quality.  
6. “Go-between” fees – the payment to a person in putting a tender together. 
7. Debatable tenderer - vendors sometimes take advantage of an entities' trust 
and several tenderers secretly collude to take turns being the lowest tenderer 
and tenders prices higher than the market value. 
8. Awards to non-lowest tenderer. 
9. Scope changes after contract award. 
10. Work is added after contract award to increase the contract value. 
11. Sole supplier – the market not sourced for competitive pricing due to a 
perceived emergency.  
12. Debatable minority ownership – companies’ owners indicating they are of the 
minority group, but they are not. 
13. Large gifts and entertainment expenses. 
14. Round invoice amounts. 
15. Copies of supporting documentation instead of originals.  
16. Duplicate payments.  
17. Sequential invoices paid.  
18. Employee-vendor address match.  
19. Multiple invoices paid on the same date.  
20. Slight variation of vendor names. 
21. The close association of employees with suppliers or companies.  
22. Regular failure to test the market for suppliers and prices. 
23. Acceptance of late tenders.  
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24. Special specifications written by end users to ensure exclusion of certain 
suppliers. 
25. Inadequate access control to tender box – only one person having the keys 
or tenders not secured after submission. 
26. Only one supplier constantly tendering/submitting a quote. 
27. Lack of clear procurement procedures and policies. 
28. Lack of segregation of duties within the procurement process. 
29. Continuous management overrides. 
30. Procurement staff not taking leave. 
31. Omission of supporting documentation to invoices. 
32. Verbal work instructions, and 
33. Work conducted out of contract scope. 
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6.2 ANNEXURE B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
TOPIC: APPRAISING INTERNAL CONTROLS TO DETECT 
PROCUREMENT FRAUD AT ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI MINES 
 
RESEARCH AIMS 
The aim of this research is to assess the internal control mechanisms in place at 
AngloGold Ashanti to investigate and detect procurement fraud. These aims will 
allow the researcher to make recommendations regarding appraising internal 
management control measures to detect and investigate the occurrence of 
procurement fraud.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What does procurement fraud entail? 
 What internal controls exist in procurement procedures to detect and investigate 
procurement fraud? 
 
You are kindly requested to answer the following questions in this interview 
schedule, for the research. The questions, responses and the results will be 
revealed. 
 
The researcher is bound to his assurances and guarantees by the ethics code for 
research of the University of South Africa. The information you provide will be used 
in a research project for a Master of Technology degree registered with the 
Programme Group: Police Practice at the University of South Africa. The analysed 
and processed data will be published in a research report. 
 
Your answers will be noted by the interviewer himself, on paper. Should any 
question be unclear, please ask the researcher for clarification. Only one answer 
per question is required. When answering the questions, it is very important to give 
your own opinion. 
 
Permission has been obtained from the various Heads of Department in advance, 
for the interview to be conducted. 
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I hereby give permission to be interviewed and that information supplied by me can 
be used in this research. 
 
YES/NO 
 
SECTION A: HISTORICAL INFORMATION 
 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your designation? 
3. To which department are you attached to and what is the function of the 
mentioned department? 
4. How long have you been employed within the investigation/audit domain? 
5. Did you attend a fraud investigation course? Yes/No (If yes, please elaborate). 
6. Are you affiliated with any professional body concerned with fraud investigation 
or auditing? 
7. What tertiary qualifications have you obtained? 
8. Have you ever investigated allegations of fraud in procurement/supply chain? 
9. Have you assessed internal controls to detect and investigate procurement 
fraud?  
 
SECTION B: WHAT DOES PROCUREMENT FRAUD ENTAIL? 
 
10. What do you understand regarding the concept of forensic investigation?  
11. What do you understand regarding the concept of criminal investigation? 
12. What do you see as the objectives of an investigation? 
13. What is your understanding of the term: procurement in the corporate 
environment? 
14. Have you been involved in a procurement fraud investigation (reference to 1 
incident will suffice)? If yes, please explain your involvement and the outcome of 
the investigation (investigator, complainant)? 
15. According to your experience, does the procurement cycle comprise phases? 
Please elaborate on each phase? 
16. In your opinion, during which phase of the procurement cycle do 
misrepresentations and or alterations usually occur? 
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17. What kind of misrepresentations and or alterations is usually made during the 
phase as discussed in the previous question?  
18. What is your understanding of the term: fraud? 
19. According to your experience, are there kinds of fraud? Please elaborate? 
20. In your view and work experience, please provide a description of procurement 
fraud in specific reference to the tender phase? 
21. What is your opinion in terms of the difficulty experienced to prove fraud during 
the tender phase of the procurement cycle? Please elaborate? 
22. According to your experience and knowledge what methods are employed 
during the tender phase of the procurement cycle to commit fraud (bid rigging, 
collusion between tenderers)? 
23. What is your understanding of the concept of “red flag indicators” of fraud?  
24. What implications does fraud have on a business entity? Please elaborate?  
 
SECTION C: WHAT INTERNAL CONTROLS EXIST IN PROCUREMENT 
PROCEDURES TO DETECT AND INVESTIGATE PROCUREMENT FRAUD? 
 
25. What do you understand of the concept of inter controls in terms of the 
procurement process or fraud? 
26. Please provide examples of internal controls in a procurement process? 
27. What is your opinion regarding the necessity for internal controls in the 
procurement cycle? 
28. Will internal controls assist in preventing procurement fraud? If the answer is 
yes, please explain? 
29. How will internal controls assist to detect and investigate procurement fraud? 
30. According to your experience and knowledge, will appraising internal controls 
assist in identifying possible fraud risks within the procurement process in 
particular the tender phase? Please explain your answer? 
31. In your opinion, is the regular assessment and audit of internal controls in 
procedures or policies, necessary? If your answer is yes, please elaborate? 
32. Is procurement fraud a risk to business and will the implementation of internal 
controls mitigate the fraud risk? Please elaborate?   
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6.3 ANNEXURE C: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
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6.4 ANNEXURE D: TFS FORENSICS 
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